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Executive summary 
This study reviews the interpretation and effectiveness of the current domestic 
legislative framework in relation to religion or belief under equality and human rights 
law. The review is based upon a detailed analysis of primary and secondary sources 
of British and European law, recent research carried out by the EHRC, the extensive 
body of academic literature in the field, and the insights of a diverse group of 
academics, legal practitioners, representatives of religion or belief organisations and 
representatives of other advisory and equality bodies.  
The report explores the legal definitions of religion and of belief and the relationship 
between them; the legal protection for religion or belief at European level and its 
application in Great Britain; the balancing of rights and the exceptions to equality law 
duties on the basis of religion or belief; the idea of a duty of reasonable 
accommodation; and the public sector equality duty. 
This report takes forward the EHRC's religion or belief strategy, Shared 
understandings. This committed the Commission to an extensive work programme 
including an assessment of the effectiveness of the existing legislative framework. 
Key findings 
The current domestic law in this area is comparatively recent, based as it is in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the changing body of equality law since the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (now consolidated in the 
Equality Act 2010). It addresses complex issues in a context where there is 
considerable difference of opinion as to how the law should be framed and applied. 
In particular, the manifestation of religion or belief carries with it the possibility of 
impacting on the rights and interests of others. For such a recent body of law, 
operating in such a complex field, it is generally clear and consistent. In particular, 
the legislation and decided cases make it clear that the law extends to a wide variety 
of religions and beliefs, including not only religions with a significant number of 
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adherents in Great Britain, but also those with much fewer members and belief 
systems which do not identify as religions.  
Nonetheless, the review indicates that there are a number of areas which may 
require further consideration. 
Firstly, the definition of belief, particularly in equality legislation, merits further 
assessment. The broad definition currently being applied by the courts is unclear, 
particularly for belief systems which are based upon scientific evidence. This results 
in apparent inconsistencies between judgments, particularly at Employment Tribunal 
level. Additionally, the relationship between “religion” and “belief” is also unclear.  
Secondly, the impact on domestic law of some specific issues which have been 
tested at European level remains unclear. For example, despite the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment in Eweida and others v the United Kingdom,1 
it remains unclear whether an individual bringing a claim will need to find a group of 
individuals who share his or her beliefs and, if so, what the size of this group 
should be. 
Thirdly, the primary focus of the case law to date has been on the relationship of the 
religious employee and their employer. The position of the religious employer, and 
the religious service provider, has been relatively unexplored in the case law, but has 
the potential to be a significant area. Important underlying issues are whether the 
existing Equality Act exceptions on the basis of religion or belief may be too narrow, 
or too wide, and how these exceptions have been interpreted by the courts. 
Fourthly, the role of the public sector equality duty (PSED) in this area may be worth 
exploring further as a way to mainstream religion or belief equality, by integrating 
religion or belief equality into the day to day practice of public sector organisations. 
To date, the research on the PSED has been focused either on the duty in general or 
protected characteristics, and it would be useful to assess its impact as it applies to 
religion or belief. 
Finally, it would be helpful to assess the extent to which a duty to accommodate 
religion or belief might be beneficial to employees and employers. The position of 
employees who have religious objections to carrying out part of their duties, or to 
carrying out their duties in a particular way, is currently approached through the 
indirect discrimination model, through which a range of factors can be taken into 
1 Eweida and others v the United Kingdom (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) 
Judgment 15 January 2013. 
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account in determining whether a response is proportionate. Canada and the United 
States deal with similar issues through a duty of reasonable accommodation of 
religion or belief, and there have been calls for such a duty to be adopted in Great 
Britain. As the review shows, different views are held about the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages of such a duty. An alternative to both the indirect 
discrimination model and the duty of reasonable accommodation might be to 
introduce a mechanism similar to the current right for employees to request flexible 
working to cover those religion or belief workplace issues which are not covered by 
the right to request (for example, dress codes and uniforms). Again, the review 
showed that different views are held about whether or not this would be beneficial for 
employees and employers. 
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1 | Introduction 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (the EHRC) was established under the 
Equality Act 2006 to work towards the elimination of unlawful discrimination, to 
promote equality of opportunity and to protect and promote human rights. Its 
mandate covers nine protected characteristics (age, disability, gender reassignment, 
race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage and civil partnership and 
pregnancy and maternity). To take forward its work on religion or belief, the EHRC 
published Shared understandings: a new EHRC strategy to strengthen 
understanding of religion or belief in public life in October 2013 (EHRC, 2013; 
Perfect, 2014). 
This strategy proposed the need to create a more informed, balanced and tolerant 
approach to religion or belief issues and is being implemented by a programme of 
EHRC work between 2014 and 2016. Its three main elements are to: 
• Improve understanding and practice by employers in managing religious diversity 
in the workplace and in balancing the right to hold and manifest a religion or belief 
and the right to freedom of expression with other rights and freedoms.  
• Create a more balanced and reasonable public dialogue on religion or belief 
issues.  
• Assess the existing legal framework on religion or belief, equality and human 
rights and whether the law offers sufficient protection for people with a religious or 
other belief. 
This report focuses on the third element in the strategy by reviewing the 
interpretation and effectiveness of the current domestic legislative framework in 
relation to religion or belief under equality and human rights law. It is intended for a 
primary readership of policy makers and organisations, including religion or belief 
organisations, with an interest in the implications of equality law for their members; 
and a secondary readership of academics and legal advisors and practitioners. It 
excludes areas such as criminal law relating to hate speech and hate crime, 
although these have been recognised as part of a broader equality agenda (Bakalis, 
2015). The report identifies and discusses the detail of this legal framework and its 
change over time, explores the strengths and weaknesses of the current law, and 
 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission · www.equalityhumanrights.com 6 
Published September 2015 
Review of religion or belief law Introduction 
 
 
considers alternative approaches to the current framework, drawing where 
appropriate on the experience of other jurisdictions. The report focuses on the key 
areas of the definition of religion or belief, the broader legal frameworks of human 
rights and equality law within which it operates, the resolution of competing rights 
claims, exceptions to normal equality law duties in relation to both employment and 
the provision of goods and services, and the extent to which employees may be 
entitled to modify their duties on the basis of their religion. The report discusses 
alternative approaches to the current legal framework, in particular the possibility of a 
duty of reasonable accommodation of religion or belief by employers or an extension 
of the current right for employees to request flexible working to cover those religion 
or belief issues which are not covered by the existing right. However, it must be 
emphasised that discussion of alternative models in no way suggests that the EHRC 
prefers any of these to the current legal model. The EHRC plans to publish a report 
setting out its own views by the end of 2015.  
1.1 Methodology and sources 
Methodology 
This report is based on a detailed analysis of primary and secondary sources of 
British and European law, as discussed below. These sources of law have been 
supplemented by consideration of the growing body of academic literature dealing 
with the interaction of law and religion or belief generally, and equality law in 
particular (Edge, 2015). It has in a number of instances been possible to make use 
of unpublished research papers and work in progress. These are important sources 
of detailed analysis, evaluation and critique of the existing law and possible paths of 
development.  
Additionally, the report has made use of wider research and policy literature relevant 
to the project more broadly. This includes two major studies commissioned by the 
EHRC. Firstly, in August 2012, the EHRC published an extensive report on religion 
or belief equality and human rights in England and Wales which combined an 
analysis of some of the major legal cases with qualitative social research (Donald, 
2012). Secondly, in March 2015, the EHRC published the findings of a large scale 
call for evidence from individuals and organisations about how their religion or belief, 
or that of other people, may have affected their experiences in the workplace and in 
using the services and facilities they need in everyday life (Mitchell and Beninger, 
2015). This project has not, however, engaged with the extensive theological 
literature within particular religious traditions.  
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To supplement this written material, the project team led four workshops in Oxford, 
London and Edinburgh between November 2014 and February 2015, to explore the 
critical issues in the field with a diverse group of academics, legal practitioners, 
representatives of religion or belief organisations and representatives of other 
advisory and equality bodies. The workshops focussed on four key areas:  
• What is protected under the law on religion or belief?  
• How do the rights of freedom of religion or belief under the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) interact with the rights to equality under European 
Union (EU) law?  
• When should there be exceptional treatment under these rights, both for those 
claiming them and for those bound to respect them?  
• What special challenges are posed to the practical application of the law, not only 
to those responsible for adjudicating disputes, but for those implementing the law 
in practice?  
The purpose of these workshops was to draw upon the expertise of participants to 
assist the project team in its analysis of published and forthcoming material, and to 
deepen its understanding of areas of current debate. Notes of each workshop were 
taken and circulated to all participants, as well as invitees who had been unable to 
attend. These notes are attached in Appendix One (hereafter Workshop 1-4). 
Finally, we have also benefitted from the contribution of a core team of academics 
who were involved throughout the programme of workshops and in commenting on 
initial drafts of this report: Professor Maleiha Malik, Dr Russell Sandberg and 
Professor Paul Weller.  
Sources 
This report draws on the primary sources of British, EU and ECHR law, as well as on 
secondary sources which analyse and comment on these primary sources. To 
supplement these sources, we considered relevant international comparators, 
particularly common law jurisdictions; looked at more theoretical work on the 
interaction of religion or belief and law; and assessed work from other disciplines 
related to religion or belief equality and human rights.  
The principal primary sources of British law are legislation, and decisions of the 
higher courts. The main contemporary legislation in this area is the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010. The Equality Act 2010 simplified and 
harmonised a range of earlier legislation whose form and working is necessary to 
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understand the development of the law. Therefore, our discussion includes 
legislation which is no longer in force.  
It should be noted that only decisions of a certain level of court are capable of 
binding future judges in, for instance, their interpretation of legislation. In Great 
Britain, the ultimate judicial authority is the Supreme Court, which replaced the 
House of Lords in 2009. The next level below the Supreme Court in England and 
Wales is the Court of Appeal and in Scotland is the Court of Session; below that, for 
employment matters, is the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) and below that the 
Employment Tribunal (ET). In England, some important religion or belief cases have, 
however, originated in the County Court, where most non-employment civil cases 
are heard; decisions in the County Court can be appealed to the High Court and then 
to the Court of Appeal. In Scotland, civil cases would be heard in the Sheriff Court, 
with appeals then lying to the Sheriff Principal and the Court of Session. Other 
religion or belief cases, involving executive agency decisions, originate in the First-
tier Tribunal, with appeals first to the Upper Tribunal and then to the Court of Appeal 
or Court of Session. Within the context of employment law, EAT decisions are 
capable of binding ETs, but ET decisions cannot generate binding precedent. 
Similarly, County Court and Sheriff Court decisions cannot generate binding 
precedent. Court decisions in England and Wales cannot bind Scottish courts and 
vice versa, though such decisions would be persuasive. 
In practice, however, lawyers advising clients or preparing litigation will seek to make 
use of such precedents as are available, and so on occasion will even cite ET 
decisions as evidence of the state of the law. Academic analysis also makes use of 
ET decisions. Therefore, while this report discusses potentially binding precedents, 
non-binding decisions are also referred to in the absence of higher authority. Cases 
are discussed as sources of law, rather than as reliable accounts of the complex 
lives of the applicants (Peroni, 2014: 196), or as an indication of the normal 
resolution of a disagreement in this area. On the last point, contributors to Workshop 
1 noted that the law emphasised conflict and reliance on rights, but disagreed over 
whether cases before the tribunals and courts reflected broader experiences (see 
Workshop 2). 
Although the Human Rights Act 1998 is an Act of Parliament, and so a source of 
domestic British law, it gives effect to the existing obligations of the UK under the 
ECHR. The ECHR, an international convention, is an important source of law on 
religion or belief within the states which are bound by it, particularly in relation to 
Article 9, which deals with freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The ultimate 
arbiter of the meaning of the ECHR is the European Court of Human Rights 
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(ECtHR). This court can hear cases brought by individuals affected by the action of a 
Contracting Party (that is a state which has chosen to become bound by the ECHR). 
The ECtHR will normally hear such cases as a Chamber, but particularly important 
cases may be heard by the larger Grand Chamber, which can also choose to hear 
again a case which has already been decided by a Chamber. Thus, although the 
ECtHR does not operate the same system of binding precedent as the British courts, 
decisions of the Grand Chamber in particular are likely to be very influential in the 
ECtHR’s future understanding of an area of law. Accordingly, this report considers 
decisions of the ECtHR at both Chamber and Grand Chamber level wherever 
relevant to understanding appropriate sections of the ECHR.  
It is worth noting from the outset, however, that the ECtHR has given a particularly 
broad discretion to states to determine the precise relationship between law and 
religion or belief. It has done so by a broad application of the general principle of the 
margin of appreciation: a doctrine of the ECtHR which recognises that state 
authorities are in the best position to determine the application of the rights under the 
ECHR to particular situations, subject to ECtHR supervision (Donald et al, 2012: 
17).2 Looking at state practice, we can see a lack of consensus across Europe on 
how these issues should be approached (see Chapter 3). This needs to be borne in 
mind when considering the impact of a particular ECtHR decision on British law 
(Donald, 2012: 48). Within this range, however, so long as the UK is a party to the 
ECHR, it is bound to respect its obligations under the Convention. This is an 
obligation of the UK in international law to the other states which have joined the 
Convention. The duty of the UK to meet its obligations under the ECHR has, 
however, been given force in UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. These are 
related, but distinct legal structures. The UK was one of the first states to ratify the 
ECHR, in 1951, but most of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not come into effect until 
2000. Between 1951 and 2000, the UK was bound in international law to meet its 
obligations under the Convention but not bound to do so in UK law. 
Another relevant (but distinct) source of European law is the developing body of EU 
law on discrimination, particularly but not exclusively that relating to discrimination on 
the grounds of religion or belief. The principal sources of EU law are the Treaties 
establishing the European Union, and legal instruments based on the Treaties. 
These are supplemented by the case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU). 
The CJEU is the highest court of the EU on matters of EU law, but has no jurisdiction 
over national law. National courts, including those of Great Britain can, and in the 
2 For a recent illustration, see S.A.S. v France, app.43835/11.  
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case of final courts of appeal, must, refer unclear issues of EU law to the CJEU, 
whose ruling as to the content of EU law is binding across the EU. Cases can also 
be brought against Member States by the European Commission or other Member 
States. Similarly to the ECtHR, the CJEU does not operate a strict system of binding 
precedent, but in practice decisions of the CJEU on a particular point offer a strong 
guide to the future behaviour of the CJEU. This report considers decisions of the 
CJEU in interpreting EU law as it applies to Great Britain. It should be noted that 
there is considerable divergence of national anti-discrimination law within the EU 
(Lock, 2013), just as there is in relation to the application of the ECHR.  
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2 | Definitional issues 
The EHRC’s call for evidence found that definition of belief was frequently identified 
by legal advisors as one of the issues on which they had provided advice, 
representation or assistance (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 141). For legal advisors 
the most important definitional issue was the extent to which a contested practice 
needed to involve a core belief or doctrine in order to be protected (Mitchell and 
Beninger, 2015: 149). Donald (2012: 52) also identified 'the uncertainty that exists 
around the definition of "belief'’ as a significant issue, noting its frequent discussion 
in legal and academic commentary. She also noted that employers and equality and 
advice specialists found it difficult to define belief. As a result, she suggested there 
may be a 'need for more detailed and accessible guidance for decision-makers 
which might assist them to achieve clarity and consistency in matters of definition or 
belief' (Donald, 2012: 55). 
The key ECHR and EU provisions do not adopt the same terminology. The 
Employment Equality Framework Directive talks about 'discrimination based on 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation',3 while referring in its preamble 
to respect for the principles of the ECHR. The Directive does not provide a definition 
of religion or belief, and implementing legislation of Member States 'has tended to 
follow the Directive in declining to define the terms’ (Vickers, 2007: 27). 
The main ECHR article which deals with religion or belief is Article 9. The freedom 
covered is of 'thought, conscience and religion', but this includes 'freedom to change 
… religion or belief', and the qualified right to manifest 'religion or belief'. In practice, 
the ECtHR has seldom relied upon the definition of religion or belief to resolve a 
case, generally preferring to take a broad approach which, at least initially, provides 
protection to a broad range of individuals. There is a wide consensus, as seen in 
Donald, that a religion or belief must 'attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, 
3 Employment Equality Framework Directive 2000/78/EC. 
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cohesion and importance and be worthy of respect in a democratic society' (Donald, 
2012: 42).4  
Other provisions of the ECHR,5 although not directly relevant to the topics covered in 
this report, have provided the ECtHR and British courts with the opportunity to make 
statements as to the definition of religion or belief which other judges have then 
taken up.  
Before 2003, religion was not generally protected by equality law. However, there 
were rules governing specific situations; some religious groups were classified as 
ethnic groups under the race discrimination legislation; and indirect discrimination 
could apply to religious practices disproportionately associated with an ethnic group 
(Edge, 2001: 248-55). The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
20036 (‘the 2003 Regulations’) defined religion or belief as meaning 'any religion, 
religious belief, or similar philosophical belief', so leaving the definition to be clarified 
more precisely by case law (Sandberg, 2011a: 53). The Equality Act 2006 (‘the 2006 
Act’) defined the key terms in section 44: it defined religion as meaning 'any religion', 
belief as meaning 'any religious or philosophical belief', and a reference to either 
including a reference to lack thereof. The 2006 Act removed the reference to 'similar' 
in relation to philosophical beliefs, and added reference to lack of religion or belief. 
The wording of the Equality Act 2010 is in line with the 2006 Act (Sandberg, 2011a: 
54-55). The absence of a more detailed definition of religion or belief leaves the 
definition to be developed by case law. This approach is found in a range of legal 
systems (Doe, 2011: 21-22). 
The definition of what is protected by the law dealing with religion or belief rights and 
equality is fundamental to the understanding and application of the law. If a court 
decides that a particular view, or practice, falls outside of the legal definition, a claim 
fails at that point. More significantly, given the relatively limited role of courts in 
resolving disputes, if the parties do not agree that a particular view or practice is 
covered, negotiations are unlikely to proceed within a shared understanding of the 
relevant legal framework. There are two distinct issues raised by the existing 
legislation regarding definitions: what is religion, and what is belief? The existence of 
4 This consensus draws on the language used in the ECtHR decision in Campbell and Cosans v UK, App. 
7511/76, 7743/76 on 'philosophical convictions' under the First Protocol, rather than religion or belief under Article 
9. 
5 For instance the provisions under the First Protocol to the ECHR which require the State to 'respect the right of 
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical 
convictions'; and the Principal VAT Directive which requires states to exempt from VAT non-profits with aims of, 
inter alia, 'religious, patriotic, philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature'. 
6 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1660. 
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distinct definitions for the two terms leads to a third issue discussed below: how do 
religion and belief interact in this context? In particular, given that belief includes 
religious belief, is there a need for a separate category of religion? 
2.1 Religion 
The courts have interpreted religion in a way which is consistent with how scholars of 
religious studies would describe their field of endeavour. This approach includes 
various forms of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism, as 
well as religions which have fewer adherents worldwide, such as Wicca.7 The 
Supreme Court decision in R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar 
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages (dealing with the registration of places of 
worship) is likely to be influential in the debate about the definition of religion 
(Sandberg, 2014a). In Hodkin, Lord Toulson found that Scientology was a religion as 
it was: 
… a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, 
which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship 
with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives 
in conformity with the spiritual understanding associated with the belief 
system. By spiritual or non-secular I mean a belief system which goes 
beyond that which can be perceived by the senses or ascertained by the 
application of science. I prefer not to use the word ‘supernatural’ to 
express this element, because it is a loaded word which can carry a 
variety of connotations. Such a belief system may or may not involve 
belief in a supreme being, but it does involve a belief that there is more to 
be understood about mankind’s nature and relationship to the universe 
than can be gained from the senses or from science. I emphasise that 
this is intended to be a description and not a definitive formula.8  
Hodkin is not only a decision of the highest British court, reversing the influential 
decision of the Court of Appeal in ex parte Segerdal9 (Edge and Corrywright, 2011; 
Edge and Loughrey, 2001), but also draws itself on a broader range of influential 
7 Holland v Angel Supermarket Ltd and Another [2013] ET 3301005-2003 (20 September 2013). 
8 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 
77 para. 57. 
9 R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697. 
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decisions elsewhere in the common law world, most notably the decision of the High 
Court of Australia in Church of the New Faith v Comr of Pay-Roll Tax (Victoria).10 
The Supreme Court in Hodkin accepted that 'there has never been a universal legal 
definition of religion in English law',11 and Lord Toulson placed his definition firmly in 
a context which distinguished between religion and 'essentially secular belief 
systems'.12 Nevertheless, the case has already begun to be taken as a benchmark 
for the interpretation of 'religion' in other legal contexts, for instance in United Grand 
Lodge of England v Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs.13 It is likely to 
form at least a starting point for a tribunal or county court considering 'religion' in the 
context of equality law. 
2.2  Belief  
There has been considerable debate about the definition of belief. Some 
commentators have argued that protecting too broad a set of religions or beliefs 
'leads to a real danger of trivialising the equality principle' (Pitt, 2011), or watering 
down the concept of religion or belief so as to bring it into disrepute (Donald, 2012: 
54).14 An alternative view of the breadth of the emerging definition of belief, as 
outlined by the Public and Commercial Services Union in the EHRC's call for 
evidence, is that it 'provides a broad level of protection and promotes tolerance more 
effectively than a narrower protection would' (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 156). 
Other participants in the call for evidence however, considered that the lack of a 
definition of belief was unhelpful and caused confusion (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 
129-30). 
As noted above, British law on religious discrimination originally defined belief as 
'any religious or similar philosophical belief';15 but this was amended in 2006 by 
10 Church of the New Faith v Comr of Pay-Roll Tax (Victoria) (1983) 154 CLR. 
11 Hodkin, para. 34. 
12 Hodkin, para. 57. 
13 In United Grand Lodge of England v Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs [2014] UKFTT 164, the 
case turned on whether the activities of the UGLE were of a religious, philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature 
so as to qualify for VAT exemption. The Tax Tribunal found, just, that the UGLE did not meet the criteria for 
religion, primarily because 'the canons of conduct promoted by Freemasonry are freestanding and not adopted to 
give effect to the belief' (para. 126). The idea of philosophical belief as being a rule of life, similar to 'religious' and 
'political' was suggested, with some reference to the ECHR but interestingly little to equality law – where the 
cases are rather against a 'rule of life' requirement.  
14 Donald was here citing the views of one of her research participants, David Pollock of the European Humanist 
Federation. 
15 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations (SI/2003/1660), s2(1). 
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deleting 'similar'. During the passage of this legislation, Baroness Scotland, the 
Attorney General, argued that 'the word ‘similar’ added nothing and was therefore 
redundant. This is because the term ‘philosophical belief’ will take its meaning from 
the context in which it appears; that is, as part of the legislation relating to 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief'. Some commentators have 
disputed Scotland's interpretation (Sandberg, 2014b: 40-41). 
In the absence of a statutory definition, the meaning of ‘belief’ has to be established 
by case law. The starting point for discussion of the cases is Grainger plc v 
Nicholson (Donald, 2012: 50).16 Justice Burton rejected arguments that a belief 
needed to constitute or allude to a 'fully-fledged system of thought', as had been 
suggested by the British Humanist Association (2007: 8), for example.17 Burton also 
rejected the arguments that a political belief, as opposed to belief in a political 
party,18 could not be a philosophical belief (Hepple, 2011: 41);19 and that it could not 
be a belief based upon or by reference to science. Instead, he laid down five criteria, 
each of which could serve as a limit on the definition of belief by excluding claimants.  
The criteria for a belief are: 
• The belief must be genuinely held. This has not posed significant conceptual 
problems.20 Whether a belief is held is ultimately a question of fact. Judges and 
tribunals have used a range of strategies to determine whether a belief has been 
genuinely held (Edge, 2012; Edge, 2002). 
• It must be a belief, and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of 
information available. This criterion was used to exclude the applicant in 
McClintock v DCA,21 where a belief that single-sex couples should not adopt was 
based on current research into the effects on children of same-sex parenting. It 
was not, however, used to exclude the claimant in Grainger itself, whose belief in 
man-made climate change might be seen as based upon scientific evidence. 
Justice Burton argued that 'if a person can establish that he holds a philosophical 
belief which is based on science, as opposed, for example, to religion, then there 
16 See Grainger plc v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4. 
17 Participants in Workshop 1 noted that the most difficult cases were those which had gone beyond 
comprehensive worldviews. 
18 See Olivier v Department for Work and Pensions, ET Case No. 1701407/2013 (discussed in 
http://www.walkermorris.co.uk/belief-democratic-socialism-can-amount-philosophical-belief-purpose-religion-or-
belief); Fraser v University and College Union [2013] ET 2203290/2011 (22 March 2013). 
19 See further Baggs v Fudge, ET Case No. 1400114/2005, 23 March 2005; Kelly and others v Unison, ET Case 
No. 2203854-57/08; GMB v Henderson, EAT 73/14/DM, 13 March 2015. 
20 In Streatfield v London Philharmonic Orchestra [2012] ET 2390772/2011, the Court found that 'any lack of 
consistency is not fatal to a determination that those beliefs were genuinely held'. 
21 [2008] IRLR 29. 
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is no reason to disqualify it from protection by the Regulations'.22 This apparent 
inconsistency suggests that this criterion is problematic, since it is potentially 
liable to very different interpretations by the courts. 
• It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour. In Lisk v Shield Guardian Co,23 this criterion was used to exclude a 
belief that one should wear a poppy to show respect to servicemen. Perhaps as a 
useful contrast, in Hashman v Milton Park, Dorset Ltd,24 however, anti-hunting 
sentiments were included; while in Maistry v BBC,25 a belief that public service 
broadcasting has the higher purpose of promoting cultural interchange and social 
cohesion was found to be covered by the legislation. Sandberg (2014b: 43-44) 
considers that the reasoning used in Lisk and that used in Hashman are difficult 
to reconcile with each other. It is worth noting that both were ET decisions, rather 
than decisions of a higher court, and it may be that a higher court would develop 
a clearer approach. 
• It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. 
This criterion was perhaps most strikingly applied in Farrell v South Yorkshire 
Police Authority.26 In that case, the claimant outlined beliefs about the existence 
of a New World Order, and its activities. The court found that the belief did not 
meet the minimum standard of cogency or coherence: 'the conspiracy theory he 
advances remains in the light of subsequent events and the weight of evidence, 
wildly improbable. There is no body of respected academic commentary in peer 
reviewed journals that supports the theory' Sandberg (2014b: 44-45), who 
analyses the case, describes the approach used by the courts as ‘arbitrary and 
unprincipled’. The principal challenge in relation to this criterion is how the courts 
can evaluate cogency and coherence while remaining neutral between different 
belief systems. This is particularly the case if, as discussed below it is unclear 
whether religious beliefs need to satisfy this criterion: particularly as not all belief 
systems regard cogency and coherence as important.  
• It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, not be incompatible with 
human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. In Arya v 
London Borough of Waltham Forest, this criterion was used to exclude a belief 
that Judaism’s teachings on the Chosen of God were incompatible with a 
22 Grainger, para. 30. 
23 Lisk v Shield Guardian Company Ltd [2011] ET Case No. 3300873, 14 September 2011.  
24 Hashman v Milton Park Dorset Ltd (t/a Orchard Park), ET Case No. 3105555, 4 March 2011. 
25 Maistry v BBC, ET Case No.1313142/10, 29 March 2011. 
26 Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority, ET 2803805/10, 16 June 2011. 
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meritocratic and multicultural society. This fifth criterion, particular with its 
reference to 'human dignity', seems to have considerable room to accommodate 
substantive judgments as to the content of a belief system, and so to act as a 
'morality filter [which] runs the risk of resting on ethical premises which will 
substantially resemble the dominant religion' (Kenny, 2014: 20). Allowing 
restriction of the manifestation of beliefs by reference to the fundamental rights of 
others, dignity, or undemocratic content, does not seem particularly controversial 
and, as the recent case of S.A.S. v France demonstrates, is likely to be 
compatible with the ECHR.27 This is not the same, however, as choosing to 
identify such belief systems as being entirely outside the scope of rights and 
protection from discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief.28 Opinion is 
divided on whether a legal definition of belief should act as this sort of filter, and 
whether it is possible to do so while retaining some form of judicial neutrality 
between religions and beliefs. Lady Hale, writing extra-judicially, has suggested 
that 'We may have to respect all faiths equally even if not all faiths are equally 
respectable' (Hale, 2014b). This sort of substantive decision making was alluded 
to during the passage of the 2003 Regulations,29 and in the Explanatory Notes to 
the Equality Act 2010, which noted that 'any cult involved in illegal activities would 
not satisfy these criteria'. This was also discussed in Workshop 1. The difficulty of 
applying the respectability criteria in a way which gives proper weight to diversity 
of religion and belief has led to some concern, as expressed by the House of 
Lords in R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment ex parte 
Williamson, that to it is inappropriate to limit protection only to beliefs which are 
respectable or of which the court approves30 (Vickers, 2010: 284-85). Others 
have argued that because protecting a religion or belief constitutes a burden on 
those required to observe the protection, some form of 'quality control' is 
legitimate (Jones, 2015).  
27 In the light of S.A.S. v France, App. 43835/11, (2014), where living together was seen as a legitimate state 
goal, protecting dignity seems comparatively conservative. It remains uncertain whether the SAS case will have a 
significant impact on domestic cases in the UK, given that the contexts in the UK and France are very different. 
28 As is suggested in Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset). 
29 Gerry Sutcliffe, Minister for Employment Relations, Competition and Consumers, said that 'It is not for the 
Government to decide on a religious doctrine, or decide whether a cult is sensible. That question is for the 
tribunals to decide' (Hansard HC, Fourth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, cols. 03-07, 17 June 
2003). 
30 E.g. in R (Williamson and others) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15 Lord 
Walker stated ‘in matters of human rights the court should not show liberal tolerance only to tolerant liberals’, 
para. 60. 
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The interaction of these criteria is potentially inconsistent. The second criterion, that a 
belief must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of 
information, potentially contradicts the fourth criterion, that it must attain a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. A stance based on the 
present state of information available, and subject to change in line with the evidence, 
is excluded; but the stance must be cogent and coherent. The claimant in Farrell 
lacked academic peer-reviewed work supporting his belief, but if he had based his 
stance on such peer-reviewed work, his stance may have ceased to be a belief and 
become an opinion. The existence of peer-reviewed work supporting a belief in man-
made climate change, however, did not prove fatal to the claimant in Grainger itself. 
The relationship between evidence and belief, therefore, remains complex. 
2.3 The relationship between religion and belief 
Some of the academic literature regards religion or belief as a single umbrella term, 
and in practical terms the crucial distinction has been described as 'not between 
religion and belief, but between protected beliefs and those that are too ill-defined to 
warrant protection' (Donald, 2012: 52), so that the difference 'will seldom, if ever, 
arise under the European Convention'.31 Nonetheless, consideration of the 
relationship between religion and belief suggests the possible importance of the use 
of two separate terms (Kenny, 2014). 
Firstly, is it possible to have a philosophical belief which is not a religious one? The 
cases, both at the European level and in Great Britain, indicate that it is.32  
Secondly, is it possible to have a religion which is not a belief? From a religious 
studies perspective, the distinction between religions which emphasise shared 
beliefs and those which emphasise shared practice is well explored; as are religions 
which determine an individual’s religion through reference to ancestry, rather than 
belief, and which are also covered by race discrimination law. The ECtHR has, 
however, consistently emphasised belief at the expense of other understandings of 
religion (McIvor, 2015). In Great Britain, in Re St Andrew Alwalton, a widow’s petition 
to exhume human remains was refused, with the judge ruling that because the 
31 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15, para. 24. 
32 UK examples would include Streatfield v London Philharmonic Orchestra Limited, where Humanism was found 
to be a protected belief; Maistry v BBC, where a belief that public service broadcasting had a higher purpose was 
similarly categorised; and Hashman v Milton Park, where a belief that foxhunting was wrong was similarly found 
to be a protected belief (in rather sharp contrast to Countryside Alliance v Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52, 
where the House of Lords found that pro-hunting views were not covered by Article 9). 
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petition was not motivated by conscience or religious belief, Article 9 was not 
implicated.33 There does not appear to be any British case where a religion which did 
not involve religious belief has been put before the Courts.34  
Thirdly, is it possible to have a religion which is also a belief? It would seem to follow 
from the discussion of the importance of belief above, that every religion is by 
definition a belief; and the assumptions in cases such as Williamson and others 
support this view. The significance of this will depend upon the practical differences 
between bringing a claim based on 'religion' and on a 'belief' which happens to be 
religious. Justice Burton, in Grainger, saw important evidential distinctions between 
the two: (a) 'To establish a religious belief, the claimant may only need to show that 
he is an adherent to an established religion. To establish a philosophical belief … it is 
plain that cross-examination is likely to be needed';35 (b) 'it is not a bar to 
philosophical belief being protected by the Regulations if it is a one-off belief and not 
shared by others'.36 User guidance, such as that from ACAS, suggests a distinction 
between what needs to be proven for religion and for belief, with religion satisfied by 
'any religious belief, provided the religion has a clear structure or belief system', while 
philosophical belief is described with reference to the more detailed and potentially 
demanding Grainger criteria (ACAS, 2014a: 3). A differential treatment between 
religion and belief appears potentially inconsistent with GMB v Henderson, where it 
was stressed that 'The law does not accord special protection to one category of 
belief and less protection for another. All qualifying beliefs are equally protected'.37  
If the emphasis on belief as the foundation of religion is accepted, and no practical 
difference is to be found in pleading religion or religious belief, the existence of these 
separate routes to claim protection might be queried. If, on the other hand, there are 
33 Similarly, if we look outside of the workplace to religious hatred, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
defines religious hatred as hatred against a 'group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of 
religious belief' (sch.1). 
34 The closest example is perhaps Lord Brown’s dissent in R(E) v Governing Body of Jewish Free School [2009] 
UKSC 15: 'Jewish schools in future, if oversubscribed, must decide on preference by reference only to outward 
manifestations of religious practice. The Court of Appeal's judgment insists on a non-Jewish definition of who is 
Jewish. Jewish schools, designated as such by the Minister and intended to foster a religion which for over 3000 
years has defined membership largely by reference to descent, will be unable henceforth even to inquire whether 
one or both of the applicant child's parents are Jewish' (para. 248). 
35 Grainger, para. 6. 
36 Grainger, para. 27. Grainger has been understood as showing, in passing, that a philosophical belief, unlike a 
religious one, does not need to be shared by others. The judge in Grainger was here influenced by the EAT 
decision in Eweida, which found that a religious belief might not be shared at all by anyone. The Court of Appeal 
in Eweida [2010] EWCA Civ 1025 took a different approach, finding that indirect religious discrimination required 
group disadvantage. This approach may not have survived the decision of the ECtHR in Eweida and Others v 
UK, App no. 4820/10, (2013) which stressed the applicant’s views. 
37 GMB v Henderson, EAT 73/14/DM, 13 March 2015, para. 62. 
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practical differences, the justification for such differences may need to be made more 
explicitly than is currently the case. 
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3 | Legal protection for religion or belief 
This chapter provides an overview of the protection for religion and belief in Great 
Britain and at European level, and addresses the question of whether or not it is 
easier to bring a successful religion or belief claim under equality law than under 
human rights law.  
3.1 The scope of the protection at European level  
Religion and belief are protected through two legal mechanisms. First, religion and 
belief are protected within the human rights framework. Secondly, as noted in 
Chapter 1, religion or belief is a protected characteristic under the equality law 
framework.  
These two frameworks share the same broad intentions and reflect the position in 
the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that ‘All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.38 The two frameworks are also legally 
interconnected in that the fundamental rights of the ECHR constitute general 
principles of EU law, and in turn, that the ECHR should be interpreted in the light of 
international law, including EU equality law.39  
However, while sharing the same deeper purpose in relation to human dignity, the 
two frameworks have a different focus. The central concern of the ECHR right is 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; with an emphasis on the protection of 
forms of belief and their manifestation. The focus of the EU law is on equality, with 
38 Art 1. Dignity also features in the preamble to the United Nations Charter, and the preambles of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR.  
39 Demir and Baykara v Turkey, Application No 34503/97, 12 November 2008. 
 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission · www.equalityhumanrights.com 22 
Published September 2015 
                                            
Review of religion or belief law Legal protection for religion or belief 
 
 
the primary aim of combatting discrimination on the protected grounds (Donald, 
2013: 70-71, Howard, 2014).40  
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
Article 9(1) states that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance.  
Article 9(2) states that: 
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Thus, under Article 9(1), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
absolute and cannot be restricted. This raises few practical difficulties in the context 
of employment and the provision of goods and services, relating more commonly to 
cases where individuals are prevented from changing religion. Instead, in the context 
of employment, education, and provision of goods and services, legal cases have 
tended to involve the right to manifest a religion. This is a qualified right, meaning 
that it can be limited where limitations are prescribed by law and where it is 
necessary and proportionate to do so for the protection of other rights such public 
safety or the rights and freedoms of others. In effect, the principle of proportionality 
allows a fair balance to be achieved between competing interests. It requires that 
there is a legitimate aim for any measure; that the measure is suitable to achieve 
that aim; and that it is necessary, in that there is no method of achieving the aim that 
involves less of a restriction on the freedom in question (Evans, 2001). 
Article 9 recognises that freedom of religion has both an individual and a collective 
dimension: the right is to manifest religion ‘either alone or in community with others’. 
In the workplace context, the right to religious freedom can therefore potentially 
40 The protected grounds in the EU Directive 2000/78 are age, disability, religion and belief, and sexual 
orientation. Directive 2000/43 protects against discrimination on grounds of race and Directive 2006/54 protects 
against discrimination on grounds of sex. 
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apply to religious employers who may wish to impose faith requirements on their 
staff, although their freedom to do so may be limited in accordance with Article 9(2). 
The right also applies to religious staff, and has tended to be engaged with regard to 
manifestations of belief; in particular, the wearing of religious symbols, time off work 
and conscientious objection to certain work tasks.  
A number of difficulties have been identified in using Article 9 in the context of 
employment and the provision of goods and services. (Sandberg, 2011a; Hill, 2013).  
First, the ECHR is an international treaty. In the past, this had raised questions as to 
whether its application was restricted to claims against the state. If this had been the 
case, this would have meant that employees in private companies or private service 
users would not be able to bring a claim under Article 9. However, this issue was 
resolved in in Eweida (discussed below), where the ECtHR found that that there is a 
positive obligation on state authorities to secure the rights under Article 9 to those 
within their jurisdiction, allowing Eweida’s claim.41 This means that employees in the 
private sector are protected by Article 9. 
Second, until Eweida, the court made a distinction between behaviour that was 
motivated by religion, which was not protected, and that which was mandated, which 
was.42 This meant that many common religious practices were not covered by the 
protection of Article 9 (Sandberg, 2011a; Donald, 2012). In particular, it led to 
discussion regarding whether a particular religious activity was ‘core’ to the belief 
system or not, with non-core beliefs left unprotected (Vickers, 2008; Hambler, 2015). 
Workshop 1 also discussed the difficulties in drawing clear boundaries around the 
concept of manifestation. However, the ECtHR confirmed in Eweida that as long as 
there is a sufficiently close and direct link between the act and the underlying belief 
there is likely to be a manifestation of religion.43 This should mean that courts are no 
longer drawn into discussions regarding whether or not a belief is a ‘core belief’ 
(Vickers, 2010). 
It therefore seems clear that, since Eweida, many of the interferences with the right 
to religious freedom identified in the employment context (such as adaptations to 
uniform codes, and refusal of requests to be exempt from performing certain work 
tasks) will be viewed as interferences with manifestations of religion, and so 
potentially protected by Article 9, even if not strictly required by the religion in 
question. In relation to service provision, dealt with more fully below, issues have 
41 Eweida, para. 84. 
42 Arrowsmith v UK [1978] 3 EHRR 218. 
43 Eweida, para. 82. 
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involved manifestations of belief such as withholding services from those whose 
actions do not accord with perceived religious teaching.44 Again, such manifestations 
could potentially be protected by Article 9.  
In addition, the ‘specific situation rule’ restricts protection where a person voluntarily 
submits to a system of rules which limits the manifestation of religion: for example 
choosing to go to work in a specific role or for a specific employer; or choosing to 
attend a particular school. In the context of employment this had been interpreted to 
mean that ECHR rights have not applied at work because the worker remains free to 
resign.45 However, this issue was also resolved in favour of the employee in Eweida. 
The ECtHR accepted that work-based restrictions on a person’s exercise of religious 
freedom can amount to an initial infringement of the right, finding that the fact that an 
employee could resign might be relevant in assessing whether a restriction on 
religious freedom was proportionate, but would not prevent the claim altogether 
(Pearson, 2013, 2014).46  
Even if an initial case can be made out, it will still need to be established that any 
interference with Article 9 cannot be justified as proportionate and for a legitimate 
aim. The concept of proportionality had been the subject of significant debate 
(Rivers, 2006, 2014; Chan, 2013). For example, in Eweida, the ECtHR found that the 
restriction on religious dress imposed on Nadia Eweida, an employee of British 
Airways who wore a cross at work, was not proportionate, but that the restriction 
imposed on Shirley Chaplin, a nurse who wore a crucifix on a chain over her uniform, 
was proportionate given the need to maintain health and safety. In assessing the 
proportionality of any restriction, the ECtHR allows some discretion (known as the 
margin of appreciation, described above) to states in their application of the ECHR, 
to reflect the fact that there is often little consensus across Europe on these matters, 
and that domestic courts are best placed to determine proportionality. The use of the 
margin of appreciation at European level means that it can be difficult to predict how 
proportionality might be determined in any particular case. For example, it could be 
proportionate both to allow the wearing of religious symbols at work and to restrict 
44 Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] UKSC 73; Ladele v Islington Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; 
then heard with Eweida (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) Judgment 15 January 
2013. 
45 Ahmad v UK (1981) 4 EHRR 126. Stedman v UK (1997) 23 EHRR CD168; Thlimmenos v Greece ECHR 2000 
– IV, (2001) 31 EHRR 15. 
46 'where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than holding that 
the possibility of changing job would negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to 
weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate.' 
Eweida, para. 83.  
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them, depending on the circumstances, as seen in the outcome of the Eweida case 
itself (McCrea, 2014; Pitt, 2013). 
The view of some respondents to the EHRC call for evidence (Mitchell and Beninger, 
2015: 8-9) was that religion should be regarded as a personal and private matter, 
with no special treatment at work. However, the decision in Eweida shows that the 
law does not support such an approach. Instead, many of the issues that previously 
may have made it difficult to use Article 9 to protect religion or belief in the context of 
employment and the provision of goods and services were resolved in that case 
(Sandberg, 2011a; Hill, 2013).  
Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief 
The second form of protection for religion or belief is by the provisions of EU 
Directive 2000/78, which protects against direct and indirect discrimination, 
harassment and victimisation on grounds of religion or belief. Direct discrimination 
occurs where a person is treated less favourably on grounds of religion or belief and 
includes where employers refuse to employ religious (or non-religious) staff 
altogether, or employ those of one religion on more favourable terms than those of a 
different religion. Direct discrimination cannot be justified. However there are some 
exceptions to this position where a religion or belief constitutes an occupational 
requirement for the job in question because of the nature of the occupation or the 
context in which the work is carried out. In such a case, discrimination will be lawful if 
it is proportionate.47 An additional and rather wider exception exists where the 
employer is an organisation with a religious ethos, and can require that members of 
staff follow that ethos.48 This is the case even though sharing a religious belief may 
not be an essential requirement for carrying out the core duties of the job. Any such 
requirement must not entail discrimination on any other ground.49 This is discussed 
in more detail below.  
Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral requirement would put 
persons of a particular religion or belief at a particular disadvantage compared with 
other persons. It can be justified where there is a legitimate aim for the requirement 
and the means of achieving the aim are appropriate and necessary.50 Examples 
47 Equality Directive 2000/78 Article 4. 
48 Equality Directive 2000/78 Article 4 (2). 
49 Equality Directive 2000/78 Article 4(2). Any requirement as to religion or belief must constitute a genuine, 
legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. Note that unlike for 
the general exception in article 4(1), the requirement does not have to be ‘determining.’  
50 Equality Directive 2000/78 Article 2(2)(b). 
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include where the employer imposes requirements in terms of uniforms or hours of 
work, with which it is difficult for those of particular religions to comply. Any such 
requirements must be justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim.  
In terms of justification, it is not yet clear what factors the CJEU will accept as 
justifying indirect religious discrimination. It is worth noting, however, that where the 
CJEU has determined the proportionality of discriminatory action in the context of 
sex discrimination, the standard of review has been very strict: any requirement must 
have a legitimate aim; the means chosen for achieving that objective must 
correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, must be appropriate with a 
view to achieving the objective in question and must be necessary to that end.51 
Given that no cases have yet come before the CJEU relating to religion or belief 
discrimination, and that practice regarding the protection of religion and belief in the 
public sphere is so varied across Europe (Haverkort, 2012; van Ooijen, 2012; 
Cumper and Lewis, 2012; Howard, 2012a, 2012b), it is as yet unclear whether the 
same strict standard of proportionality, developed in the context of gender and race 
equality, will apply to religion or belief cases.  
In the absence of case law, it is suggested that factors that might be taken into 
account in making a proportionality judgment in religion or belief cases include 
whether the requirement will have the effect of limiting religious freedom, the type of 
business (whether it is public or private, or providing services to the public, as 
discussed in Workshops 1 and 4), and the nature of the request and how in practice 
it could be allowed. Some participants in the workshops noted that this could result in 
those with stricter religious positions being provided with greater protection. They 
thought that if the religious rule is strict and the believer considers that failure to 
manifest it (i.e. non-compliance) will have serious and eternal consequences, a court 
may find that a restriction on manifestation is a disproportionate interference with 
religious freedom. In contrast, a restriction on a more modest demand, such as a 
preference for a particular behaviour, from a more liberal religious perspective, may 
be proportionate, as the level of interference with religious freedom is more limited. 
Thus, although there is no case law as yet to support this view, courts might end up 
providing greater protection for stricter or less flexible forms of religion.  
It is worth noting that the development of protection for freedom of religion or belief 
at work is a fairly recent phenomenon, and conceptions of the relationship between 
religion and the public sphere are still developing (McCrudden, 2011), with practice 
51 Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607-1631 [1986] ECR 1607. 
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across Europe varying significantly (Haverkort, 2012; Vickers, 2007). Religious 
equality was only introduced in most Member States in response to the need to 
implement the 2000/78 Directive in 2003; and until 2013 it was unclear whether the 
ECHR’s protection for religious freedom applied to the workplace at all. So far, then, 
there has been little case law to rely on in order to determine the effectiveness of the 
law at European level and the question of whether cases are better brought as 
human rights or equality cases. In Great Britain, as Donald (2012: 44) notes, the 
Equality Act 2010 (and its predecessors) has come to be viewed by legal 
practitioners as a firmer basis for pursuing claims relating to religion or belief 
(Sandberg 2011a).52 
However, one contrast between the two systems should be noted (Howard, 2014). 
The ECtHR relies heavily on the margin of appreciation doctrine, and in religion 
cases a fairly wide margin operates (Evans, 2001: 143-44). This means that states 
are afforded a significant margin of discretion in their protection of religious freedom, 
and that interferences are not subjected to particularly high levels of scrutiny. In 
contrast, the CJEU has a tradition of imposing a strict standard of review in its 
gender and race equality jurisprudence, whereas a lower standard of review has 
been applied in age discrimination cases. However, no cases relating to religious 
discrimination have yet been heard by the court, making it difficult to predict its likely 
approach on the issue.  
3.2 Application of the law in Great Britain  
Equality claims in Great Britain are brought under the Equality Act 2010. The 
Equality Act provides the legal framework to protect the rights of individuals and 
advance equality and is the mechanism in England and Wales and in Scotland by 
which Great Britain meets its obligations under EU Directive 2000/78 (see 
Dingemans et al, 2013). Human rights claims are brought under the Human Rights 
Act 1998, which has the effect of incorporating the protections in the ECHR into UK 
law. 
 
52 For example, in R (Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls’ High School, [2008] EWHC 
(Admin) 1865, the claimant’s legal team relied on race and religious discrimination laws rather than Article 9 to 
protect her freedom to wear a Sikh kara bangle at school. 
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Article 9 ECHR and Human Rights Act 
Although a number of human rights cases have been brought in the UK under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 using Article 9, they have been largely unsuccessful, usually 
because any interference has been justified under Article 9(2). For example in 
Williamson, the House of Lords found that although the ban on corporal punishment 
in schools interfered with the religious freedom of the claimants who had a religious 
belief in the importance of corporal punishment, it was justified for the legitimate aim 
of protecting children.  
Some cases have been unsuccessful for the reasons discussed above. The specific 
situation rule has been used to find that there has been no interference with religious 
freedom. For example in R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School,53 the House of Lords found there to be no interference with religious 
freedom when a school excluded a school girl for refusing, for religious reasons, to 
abide by the school uniform code. One of the reasons for this decision was that she 
could have chosen to attend a school which did allow her to wear religious dress. 
Other domestic cases have been unsuccessful on the basis that the practice in 
question was not a manifestation. For example, in R (Playfoot) v Millais School 
Governing Body,54 where a schoolgirl wished to wear a ‘purity ring’ to signify her 
religious commitment to chastity before marriage, the practice was found not be 
covered by Article 9 as it was not sufficiently closely linked to the religious belief.  
Given that both the specific situation rule and the issue of manifestation of religion 
were given a broader interpretation by the ECtHR in Eweida, it could be that in future 
domestic courts will be more willing to find prima facie breaches of Article 9 in 
religion or belief cases. However, as discussed in Workshop 1, it is too early to 
assess whether this will be the case in practice.  
Although after Eweida it may be easier to identify an interference with Article 9, the 
final stage in any claim will be to determine whether the interference was justified as 
a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim, such as the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. Proportionality was considered in Bull and Bull v Hall 
and Preddy.55 It was held that the restriction on religious freedom created by the 
requirement imposed on the Bulls56 that they offer their bed and breakfast 
accommodation to all, regardless of sexual orientation, was proportionate, given their 
53 [2006] UKHL 15. 
54 [2007] EWHC (Admin) 1698. 
55 Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] UKSC 73. 
56 By the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, now covered by the Equality Act 2010. 
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legal obligation to provide a service in a non-discriminatory fashion and the rights of 
Hall and Preddy to be free from sexual orientation discrimination. It was noted that 
very weighty reasons are required to justify discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation.57 The issues that arise from balancing the rights of those who hold a 
religion and other equality rights are discussed in Chapter 4.  
Equality Act 2010 
EU Equality Directive 2000/78 is implemented in Great Britain by the Equality Act 
2010 which protects against direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and 
victimisation because of religion or belief. Direct discrimination occurs where a 
person is treated less favourably because of religion or belief and includes where 
employers refuse to employ religious (or non-religious) staff altogether, or employ 
those of one religion on more favourable terms than others. Direct discrimination 
cannot be justified, although Schedule 9 provides exceptions for occupational 
requirements, discussed further below.  
Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons of a particular religion or belief at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other persons. It can be justified where there is a 
legitimate aim for the requirement and the means of achieving the aim are 
proportionate and necessary.  
Harassment related to religion or belief occurs where a person engages in unwanted 
conduct which has the purpose or effect of violating another person’s dignity; or 
where a person creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment for another person, related to religion or belief.58  
Direct discrimination  
There have been few direct discrimination cases in the higher courts, and although 
there is some evidence of such discrimination in practice, it has not led to difficulties 
in interpretation of the law (Sandberg, 2011a).  
One area that has caused debate, including in the workshops, is the distinction 
between direct and indirect discrimination. On the face of it, the distinction appears 
clear. Direct discrimination occurs where the less favourable treatment is because of 
religion or belief; indirect discrimination arises because of the use of neutral criteria 
57 Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] UKSC 73, para. 53. 
58 S 26 Equality Act 2010. 
 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission · www.equalityhumanrights.com 30 
Published September 2015 
                                            
Review of religion or belief law Legal protection for religion or belief 
 
 
which have an unequal impact in practice for reasons related to religion or belief. 
However, some commentators have questioned whether the distinction is as clear in 
practice (Hale, 2014a; Pitt, 2011; McColgan, 2009). This was also the view of some 
workshop participants. This is particularly the case since the meaning of direct 
discrimination was expanded in James v Eastleigh Borough Council59 to mean that 
direct discrimination can occur where the discrimination is because of a factor which 
itself is entirely determined by the characteristic in question. In James, the factor in 
question was retirement age, which itself was determined by gender and so was said 
to amount to gender discrimination. In the context of religious discrimination, some 
have queried whether rules such as bans on face coverings which, in practice, apply 
almost exclusively to one religious group (Muslim women) ought instead to be 
treated as direct discrimination, an argument that was unsuccessful in Azmi v 
Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council60 (Pitt, 2011: 392; McColgan, 2009: 13). This 
issue was also discussed in Workshop 1. Indeed the ECHR does not make the same 
distinction between direct and indirect discrimination (Hale, 2014a). However, with 
regard to the ECHR protection, the lack of distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination also means that direct discrimination can be justified. In domestic and 
EU non-discrimination law direct discrimination cannot usually be justified.61 Thus an 
extension of the meaning of direct discrimination in equality law to include situations 
where a general rule predominantly disadvantages one religious group in practice 
would be significant. 
Indirect discrimination62 
Claims involving religion or belief have more commonly involved indirect 
discrimination. This is mainly because when religious staff or service users seek to 
manifest religion or belief, a refusal to allow them to do so may amount to a neutral 
rule which puts the person with the religion or belief at a disadvantage compared to 
others. Any such rule then needs to be justified if it is not to amount to indirect 
discrimination.  
A critical issue with regard to indirect discrimination is whether it requires group 
disadvantage (discussed in Workshop 1). In Eweida, the Court of Appeal confirmed 
the previously held view that indirect discrimination requires a particular 
59 James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751. 
60 [2007] UKEAT/0009/07. 
61 With the exception of age discrimination and some forms of disability discrimination.  
62 Equality Act 2010, s 19. 
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disadvantage to a group (Vickers, 2009).63 Although Nadia Eweida was then 
successful in her Article 9 claim, this does not necessarily mean that the position on 
group disadvantage will change in domestic law. In Mba v London Borough of 
Merton,64 the Court of Appeal suggested that although Article 9 protects individuals 
as well as groups, this would not mean that the Directive or domestic law should be 
interpreted so as to enable indirect discrimination to apply to individual claimants.65 
However, the point is not definitively dealt with in the case, as the question of group 
disadvantage had been conceded on the facts; moreover, as Lord Justice Vos 
confirmed, this issue was not fully argued.66  
The case of Eweida proceeded on the assumption that no group of individuals 
existed who shared her beliefs. However, in most cases more than one person is 
likely to hold the belief. Indeed at the ECtHR, Eweida’s case was heard alongside 
that of Shirley Chaplin, a nurse who also held the belief that she should manifest her 
religion by wearing a crucifix, demonstrating that Eweida’s belief was not unique to 
her. In Eweida, the Court of Appeal left open whether the group in question would 
need to comprise other co-workers, or just others with the same views in society at 
large. However if the broader understanding of the group is accepted, then the 
concern for the ‘lone believer’ may remain hypothetical, as other believers are likely 
to be identifiable somewhere, albeit not in the same workplace.  
It appears, then, that the question of group disadvantage was not fully determined in 
Mba. Moreover, a second related question was considered by the Court of Appeal 
regarding the size of the group affected and whether this has any effect on the 
question of proportionality. It seems that this issue can cut both ways when 
considering proportionality. Where a large number of individuals are affected by any 
restriction on religion, it is arguable that more effort should be made by the employer 
to remove the obstacle to religious manifestation. This would mean that restrictions 
on religion would be harder to justify where the number affected is large. Conversely, 
as discussed in Workshop 1, it may be more difficult for an employer to allow 
requests from many individuals, for example if large numbers of staff want time off 
work at the same time. Consequently, it may be easier to justify restrictions on 
religious manifestations where the numbers are high, because the costs to the 
business are likely to be higher. In contrast, requests from a small number of 
63 Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80, paras 13-24. See also Chatwal v Wandsworth Borough Council 
[2011] UKEAT 0487_10_0607. 
64 [2013] EWCA Civ 1562. 
65 See [2013] EWCA Civ 1562, paras. 34-35.  
66 [2013] EWCA Civ 1562, para. 41. 
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individuals may be much easier to allow as fewer changes to the work environment 
will be needed. So, although in Mba it was recognised that the size of the group may 
be relevant to the question of proportionality, it remains unclear exactly how this will 
affect the issue.  
Application of the law in the workplace 
In the workplace, cases have commonly involved religious symbols and work 
uniforms, hours of work, proselytisation in the workplace and refusal of work tasks 
(Donald, 2013: 60). These cases are sometimes referred to as conscientious 
objection, although as Donald (2012: 83) notes, the courts have treated them as 
indirect discrimination cases and reserved the term conscientious objection for 
military service cases, and then abortion (as discussed below). Hambler (2015) uses 
a different term, ‘negative manifestation’ to refer to employees who object to 
performing aspects of their work for religious reasons; the term ‘passive 
manifestation’ is used for employees who express religious views visually, for 
example through uniforms; and the term ‘active manifestation’ for those who 
proactively articulate their beliefs.  
Dress codes and uniforms  
The issues relating to dress codes are illustrated by two cases. First, in Azmi, Aishah 
Azmi, a teaching assistant, was dismissed for refusing to remove her niqab67 when 
assisting in class. The court held that the restriction on wearing the niqab was a 
neutral rule which put her at a disadvantage. However, it was justified as it was a 
proportionate measure given the interests of the children in having the best possible 
education. In that case, the employer had investigated whether the needs of the 
children could be met with the niqab in place, and so they had evidence to back up 
their case that the indirect discrimination caused was justified (Hill and Sandberg, 
2007; Vickers, 2010). In contrast, in Noah v Sarah Desrosiers (trading as Wedge)68 
Bushra Noah, a Muslim who was applying for a hairdressing position, succeeded in 
her indirect discrimination claim when Desrosiers stated that she would be required 
to remove her hijab69 while at work if appointed. The justification for this rule, 
submitted by the employer, was to promote the image of the hairdressers. The 
employment tribunal found that the requirement for hairdressers to have their own 
hair visible was not a proportionate means of achieving this aim, in particular 
67 A cloth covering the face. 
68 ET 2201867/2007. 
69 A headscarf covering the hair but not the face.  
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because in this case the employer had not brought any evidence that this was the 
case (Jones, 2012; Catto and Perfect, 2015; Sandberg, 2009; Woodhead with Catto, 
2009). The tribunal did not require the employer to go so far as to carry out a trial to 
test the impact of the headscarf on business. However, it did note that there was 
some onus on the employer to bring evidence that the wearing of the headscarf 
would have an adverse effect on the business. In the absence of any such evidence, 
the requirement was found not to be justified.  
Requests about religious requirements are routinely allowed in terms of uniforms and 
dress codes at work (van Ooijen, 2012) and they are only restricted where 
employers can provide good reasons, such as health and safety requirements, the 
requirements of effective service delivery or other business needs. Azmi and Noah 
show that whilst carrying out a trial or testing various options is not required before a 
restriction on religious dress can be justified, nonetheless it is not sufficient merely to 
identify business reasons for a restriction; employers will also need to show that the 
business reasons apply in the particular case.  
Time off for religious observance  
Prima facie, indirect discrimination also occurs if employers refuse requests for time 
off for religious observance, as the refusal puts religious individuals at a 
disadvantage compared to those who do not need time off. Any such refusal will 
need to be justified, and reasons may relate to the business needs of the employer 
or service users. This has given rise to a number of cases, with varied outcomes, 
making it difficult to predict exactly how courts may deal with a case in advance. For 
example, in Thompson v Luke Delaney George Stobbart Ltd70 a Jehovah’s Witness 
was refused permission for time off work on Sundays. Her discrimination claim was 
upheld: the refusal was not proportionate because there were other employees who 
could have covered the Sunday shift without difficulty. In contrast, in Cherfi v G4S 
Security Services Ltd71 the refusal of a request by security guard to adapt his 
working hours to facilitate attendance at a mosque for prayer on Fridays was found 
to be justified. The employer required a certain number of security staff to be on site 
during operating hours, and so his request was turned down. The employer offered a 
number of alternative options but these were refused. Cherfi’s indirect discrimination 
claim was unsuccessful, as the requirement to be on site during the shift was found 
to a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Similarly, in Mba v London 
70 [2011] NIFET 00007 11FET (15 December 2011). 
71 [2011] UKEAT 0379_10_2405 (24 May 2011). 
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Borough of Merton72 the refusal of a request not to work on Sundays was found to 
be proportionate. Although the employer had managed to arrange the rota to 
accommodate her request for nearly two years, this was no longer possible, and 
there was no viable or practical alternative but to require her to be available to work 
on Sundays. The difference between the cases appears to relate to the extent to 
which the employer had made attempts to accommodate the employee’s request. 
However, there are no hard and fast rules and the cases are very fact sensitive.  
Proselytisation  
A further area in which cases of indirect discrimination have arisen is that of 
harassment and freedom of religious expression, including through prayers and the 
distribution of literature. Such activity can be viewed by the religious staff member as 
the manifestation of religion, and so any restrictions on religious expression at work 
could be indirectly discriminatory unless they are justified. However, as other 
members of staff or customers may object, and such activity may amount to 
harassment, restrictions may be justified. 
Simple conversations about religion or belief are unlikely to amount to harassment, 
but if conversations persist once it has been made clear that they are unwelcome, it 
is possible that they could come within the definition: the religious employee will 
have engaged in unwanted conduct with the effect of creating an intimidating or 
offensive environment for the other person.73 
Proselytisation may also raise concerns about freedom of religion. Although the right 
to manifest religion does cover proselytising, any such right is not absolute, and is 
limited where it is improper.74 Proselytising will be improper if it interferes with the 
rights of others, for example, to be free from the inappropriate promotion of religion 
either as a service user, or at work.75 Thus although harassment cases involving 
proselytisation may engage rights to religious freedom on the part of individuals who 
wish to share their beliefs, interference can be justified in order to respect the rights 
of others.  
Whether staff can share their religious views with others, particularly when those 
views involve negative views regarding lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people, has 
caused some concern (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 12). In some cases, speech 
72 [2013] EWCA Civ 1562. 
73 Equality Act 2010 s 26. 
74 Kokkinakis v Greece [1993] 17 EHRR 397. 
75 Chondol v Liverpool City Council [2009] UKEAT 0298/08.  
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regarding religious attitudes to LGB people may be viewed as harassment, and such 
speech may be restricted at work. In such cases, freedom to debate religious 
doctrine will need to be balanced against the need to protect the dignity of other 
workers.  
Cases involving disciplinary action for speech related to sexuality have been dealt 
with using indirect discrimination law. In Apelogun-Gabriels v London Borough of 
Lambeth,76 Tunde Apelogun-Gabriels claimed religious discrimination when he was 
dismissed for distributing ‘homophobic material’ to co-workers. He had organised 
prayer meetings for Christian staff and then distributed some verses from the Bible 
which were critical of same-sex sexual activity to members of the prayer group and 
other co-workers. Other staff members found them offensive and complained. The 
tribunal found that the material was offensive to LGB people and although it had not 
been targeted at these staff, this nonetheless meant that any indirect discrimination 
involved in his dismissal was justified. In Haye v London Borough of Lewisham,77 
Denise Haye, a Christian administrative assistant, was dismissed after posting her 
beliefs about LGB practice on the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement’s website, 
using her work computer. The tribunal dismissed the claim of religious discrimination: 
any indirect discrimination was justified.  
Opting out of work duties 
A final set of cases in which the protection of religion or belief has been engaged has 
involved opting out of work duties, which, as noted, is sometimes termed 
conscientious objection (Hambler, 2012: Leigh and Hambler, 2014). This issue was 
discussed in Workshop 4. In many cases, the issues can be dealt with simply, while 
others have been more difficult. For example, requests related to selling alcohol or 
handling meat products can be dealt with similarly to those relating to uniforms or 
time off work: where proportionate, requests can be refused, but a refusal may be 
indirectly discriminatory when it would be easy to allow the request. So for instance, 
whilst it would be proportionate for an employer to refuse a request from a butcher 
who wished not to handle meat, a request from a butcher to be exempt from 
requests to handle alcohol, as part of an occasional promotional event, for example, 
should probably be allowed if other staff can cover the task.78 However, employers 
would probably not be expected to let staff opt out of a task where this makes the 
76 (2006) ET Case No. 2301976/05. 
77 (2010) Reported by Christian Concern: http://www.christianconcern.com/sites/default/files/Appendix-CLC-
Cases_0.pdf. (Accessed: 27 August 2015). 
78 See for example, Chatwal v Wandsworth Borough Council [2011] UKEAT 0487_10_0607. 
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service inoperable, or where the effect is that an unpopular task falls repeatedly on a 
small group, with negative effects on staff morale.  
A range of factors can be identified that might be relevant to any assessment of the 
proportionality of a refusal to allow a member of staff to opt out of a task, such as the 
size of the organisation; whether the workplace is public or private sector; and 
whether it has a religious ethos (Vickers, 2008; Workshop 4). Some commentators 
have also suggested that individuals have some responsibility to choose occupations 
which do not fundamentally conflict with their beliefs (Donald, 2013: Leader, 2007).  
 In some cases, an employee has refused to undertake a task for reasons which are 
discriminatory. These cases have been contentious and respondents to the EHRC 
call for evidence expressed strong views on these issues (Mitchell and Beninger, 
2015). For example, in Ladele v Islington Borough Council,79 a marriage registrar, 
Lillian Ladele, sought to be excused from carrying out civil partnerships on the basis 
of her religious beliefs, but permission was refused. The case was treated as one of 
indirect discrimination: the requirement to carry out the civil partnership was a neutral 
requirement which caused disadvantage to Ladele because she did not feel able to 
comply with it for religious reasons. However, the Council was able to justify the 
requirement as it was necessary for all staff to offer all services to everyone, as part 
of the Council’s ‘Dignity for All’ policy (Sandberg, 2011a).  
This finding was upheld by the ECtHR in Eweida. This case was brought under the 
ECHR provisions on freedom of religion and belief, and the conclusion was the 
same. This shows that whether the matter is approached as an equality issue or as a 
matter of human rights, the conclusion is clear: conscientious objection in the context 
of the workplace will not outweigh the rights of others which may be infringed by 
allowing the objection. Employers do not need to allow requests to opt out of work 
duties when to do so may interfere with others’ rights, so that their decision is likely 
to be justified. (For commentary on the case see McCrea, 2014; Hambler 2010, 
2012; Pitt 2013; Stychin 2009; Scriven, 2012). 
There is one sector in which conscientious objection can be explicitly requested. It 
relates to objections to abortion or activities related to the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990. Here special rules apply, although they are not limited to 
religious objections. With regard to abortion, section 4(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 
states: ‘no person shall be under any duty…to participate in treatment authorised by 
this Act to which he has a conscientious objection.’ Similar terms can be found in 
79 Ladele v Islington Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1357. 
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Section 38 (1) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. The scope of this 
exemption has been tested in a number of cases, and in the most recent one, 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan,80 it was confirmed that it is limited only to 
the medical process of abortion. Those engaging in broader activity related to the 
follow up care of the patient are not covered by the provisions. They will, however, 
be covered by the general provisions of Article 9 ECHR and the Equality Act. 
Therefore, requirements to be involved in care of patients before or after an abortion 
may be said to be indirectly discriminatory against those with religion or belief 
objections: and any requirement for them to participate will need to be justified, as 
discussed above (Cranmer, 2012; Vickers, 2014). 
3.3 The special position of schools  
As discussed in Workshops 2 and 3, special rules relating to discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief apply to teachers in schools (Vickers, 2009, 2012; 
Sandberg, 2011a: 150-68). Different provisions apply in Scotland and in England and 
Wales. 
In England and Wales, the position is covered by the Schools Standards and 
Framework Act 1998 (SSFA), as amended by the Education and Inspections Act 
2006, to which the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 are subject. The provisions of 
the SSFA distinguish between different types of school: voluntary aided (VA) 
voluntary controlled (VC), community schools, foundation schools and academies.81 
The distinction between the different types of school relate to questions of funding 
and the legal question of who employs staff, rather than the extent of the religious 
input.82  
In summary, in community schools and other schools which do not have a religious 
character, teachers cannot be discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief, 
including for refusing to give religious education.83 With regard to schools with a 
religious character, the main distinction is between VA schools, on the one hand, 
and VC and foundation schools, on the other. In VC or foundation schools with a 
80 [2014] UKSC 68. 
81 In addition, there are City Technology Colleges, funded directly by the Government, rather than via a local 
education authority.  
82As a general rule, Voluntary Aided schools and Voluntary Controlled schools are faith schools. Foundation 
schools and Academies may or may not be faith based, and Community schools are rarely faith based.  
83 SSFA 1998 s59. The provision applies to working as a teacher, and being employed for the purposes of the 
school otherwise than as a teacher. 
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religious character, religion can be taken into account in appointing the head 
teacher, and in addition the school can ‘reserve’ up to a fifth of its teaching staff who 
can be ‘selected for their fitness and competence’ to give religious education in 
accordance with the tenets of the faith of the school.84 VA schools can impose 
religious requirements on all teaching staff, although with regard to non-teaching 
staff there is a small difference between England and Wales. In England non-
teaching staff are covered by the exceptions in the Equality Act, discussed above, 
whereas in Wales, the SSFA provides that non-teaching staff are not to be 
‘disqualified by reason of …religious opinions, or of …attending or omitting to attend 
religious worship, from being employed’.85 The provisions of the SSFA as they apply 
to heads and reserved teachers in VC schools, and all teachers in VA schools, go 
beyond what would be allowed under the Equality Act 2010 as they do not contain a 
requirement of proportionality in their application (Vickers, 2009). However, it should 
also be noted that the SSFA does not create any special exceptions with regard to 
other grounds of discrimination such as sex or sexual orientation. Thus, although the 
Act may allow discrimination on religious grounds, such discrimination will be 
unlawful if it results in indirect sex or sexual orientation discrimination. The exception 
for such discrimination with regard to employment for the purposes of an organised 
religion discussed below at section 4.186 does not extend to employment in 
schools.87  
In Scotland, the position is covered by the Education (Scotland) Act 1980. Where a 
teacher wishes to be appointed to a post in a denominational school managed by an 
Education Authority, they are required to be approved as regards their religious 
belief and character by representatives of the relevant church or denominational 
body.88 The Equality Act exception relating to statutory provisions applies.89 In 
relation to all other schools, the general Equality Act employment provisions apply.
84 SSFA 1998 s58. After amendment by section 37 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006, if the head 
teacher is appointed to teach religious education, the headteacher counts as a reserved teacher. This means that 
the extra religious requirements can be imposed on the head teacher.  
85 SSFA s 60(6). 
86 Schedule 9 Equality Act 2010. 
87 R (on the application of Amicus – MSF and others) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and others 
[2004] EWHC 860 (Admin).  
88 Section 21 (2A). 
89 Schedule 22 Para 1 (1). 
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4 | Balancing rights 
The media focus on apparent conflicts between religion and other rights can lead to 
an increased perception of significant and unresolvable problems with the legal 
framework (Malik, 2008; Hambler, 2015). Public perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of the legislation may also be influenced by media reports on high 
profile cases (Donald, 2012: 43-44; Weller et al, 2013: Catto and Perfect, 2015).  
A common concern relating to the protection of religion and belief is that it can have 
an impact on the protection of other fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom 
of expression, or rights related to equality, especially equality on grounds of sexual 
orientation (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015; Woodhead with Catto, 2009). Legally these 
issues are largely dealt with, as has been described above, through the 
proportionality mechanism within indirect discrimination. Evidence from the 
workshops as well as from the EHRC call for evidence suggests that the difficulties 
are not widespread, but that instead resolution is possible in many cases. Indeed, 
some commentators have argued that concerns about conflicts between religion and 
equality as being both intractable and widespread are often overstated (Malik, 2008). 
Restrictions are allowed on an individual’s right to manifest their religion, as long as 
these restrictions are proportionate. Where the manifestation has an impact on the 
rights of others, then any restriction must be proportionate in order to respect the 
rights of others (Trispiotis, 2014). 
Examples of this process can be seen in the discussion above of proselytisation and 
harassment. For example, as was seen in the discussion of harassment, speech 
regarding religious attitudes to LGB people may be viewed as harassment, and such 
speech may be restricted at work. In such cases, freedom to debate religious 
doctrine will need to be balanced against the need to protect the dignity of other 
workers. Cases such as Apelogun Gabriels v London Borough of Lambeth90 and 
Haye v London Borough of Lewisham91 discussed above demonstrate that the need 
90 (2006) ET Case No. 2301976/05. 
91 (2010) Reported by Christian Concern: http://www.christianconcern.com/sites/default/files/Appendix-CLC-
Cases_0.pdf, (Accessed: 27 August 2015). 
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to protect freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression will not provide a 
defence to a claim of harassment. Moreover, in two Employment Tribunal cases, 
Mbuyi v Newpark Childcare92 and Wasteney v East London NHS Foundation Trust,93 
it was decided that that disciplinary action by an employer against an employee who 
expressed negative views towards LGB people in conversation with colleagues did 
not amount to harassment.94   
The cases of Ladele and Hall and Preddy are illustrative of the legal approach to 
resolving cases in which both sexual orientation and religion are involved. As seen 
above, in Ladele95 where the marriage registrar was required to carry out civil 
partnerships the case was treated as one of indirect discrimination. Here, Islington 
Council justified the requirement on the basis that it was necessary as part of the 
Council’s ‘Dignity for All’ policy.96 The case demonstrates that individual’s claims for 
opt outs from work duties due to religious beliefs do not outweigh the rights of others 
who are harmed by allowing the opt out; and employers are under no duty to allow 
discriminatory requests for accommodation of religion or belief. This will mean that a 
refusal to permit an opt out from work duties is likely to be proportionate in 
circumstances where the opt out may interfere with the rights of others. 
Proportionality was also used in balancing rights in Hall and Preddy,97 considered 
above. Here the court held that the legislative requirement imposed on the Bulls to 
offer their bed and breakfast accommodation to all, regardless of sexual orientation, 
was a proportionate limitation on their religious freedom, in the light of the rights of 
Hall and Preddy to be free from sexual orientation discrimination. Very weighty 
reasons would be required in order to justify discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation.98 The same reasoning would likely apply to other situations discussed in 
the workshops regarding the provision of services to the public.  
Where there is a need to balance rights of this type, most cases will be interpreted in 
the same way as in Hall and Preddy, with weighty reasons required before refusal of 
92 Mbuyi v Newpark Childcare [2015] Case Number: 3300656/2014 
93Wasteney v East London NHS Foundation Trust [2015] Case Number 3200658/2014. 
94 It should be noted, however, that Mbuyi was successful in parts of her claim as the Employment Tribunal found 
that stereotypical assumptions had been made by the employer in the investigation of the dispute between Mbuyi 
and her colleague, which had little evidence to support them. This had been done because of her beliefs, and led 
to a finding that Mbuyi’s treatment had been directly discriminatory. Mbuyi v Newpark Childcare [2015] Case 
Number: 3300656/2014 at paras 151-158. 
95 Ladele v Islington Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; then heard with Eweida (Applications nos. 
48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) Judgment 15 January 2013.  
96 Eweida (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) Judgment 15 January 2013. 
97 Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2013] UKSC 73. 
98 Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy, para. 53. 
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a service based on sexual orientation can be justified. However, where the employee 
or service provider is expected not only to provide a service but to express support 
for a position with which they disagree, it might be argued that the right to freedom of 
expression should be weighed alongside the other interests to mean that some form 
of exception becomes warranted. A case in which such issues arose is the Northern 
Ireland case, Gareth Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd, McArthur and McArthur,99 
which is discussed below, and is currently subject to appeal.   
The cases have also been interpreted by some commentators as emblematic of a 
conflict between religion and sexual orientation equality. In particular, some 
workshop participants and some commentators (Christians in Parliament, 2012: 37; 
Woodhead with Catto, 2009) believe that in these cases sexual orientation equality 
has been prioritised over religion or belief equality. Other commentators believe that 
human rights based arguments have been trumped by equality interests (Trigg, 
2012; Rivers, 2010, 2011).  
However, claims that one form of equality is being given priority over another do not 
accurately reflect the legal reasoning in the cases. The cases have been resolved by 
applying the current law on indirect discrimination, according to which requirements 
which might at first seem indirectly discriminatory can be justified where 
proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate aim, such as the aim of protecting the rights of 
others. Such an outcome is also reached when human rights claims are made, as 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief is limited where it interferes with the rights 
of others. Both legal frameworks are thus able to take into account competing 
interests without the creation of formal hierarchies.  
It was suggested in the workshops that rather than a hierarchy between protected 
characteristics, there may be a hierarchy of direct and indirect discrimination: direct 
discrimination is given greater protection than indirect discrimination, because it 
cannot be justified. So for example, the council’s requirement that its registrars 
perform civil partnerships indirectly discriminated against Ladele, but this was 
justified as her refusal to perform civil partnerships would have been directly 
discriminatory to LGB couples on grounds of their sexual orientation. 
99 Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd and McArthur and McArthur (2015), County Court of Northern Ireland 19 May 
2015 (online at http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Cases%20and%20Settlements/2015/Lee-v-
Ashers_Judgement.pdf). 
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4.1 Exceptions on the basis of religion or belief to equality law 
duties  
To address the balancing of rights, there are instances when individuals and 
organisations are not required to meet a generally applicable legal obligation 
because of a legal exception based on their religion or belief (Jones, 2012). In the 
later discussion of reasonable accommodation, the report looks at requests from 
employees for a modification of their working experience in order to accommodate 
their religious interests. This section focuses on the employer, and less centrally the 
service provider, and their religious interests. The legal framework dealing with these 
two forms of request for a change in the general application of the law is very 
different. 
The Equality Act 2010 contains a number of exceptions.100 As discussed by 
Sandberg (2011a: 117-28), many of these exceptions are uncontroversial, but this 
has not been the case with the religious exceptions relating to employment and the 
provision of goods or services.  
Exceptions relating to employment 
The Equality Act 2010 contains exceptions from generally applicable non-
discrimination duties under Schedule 9. This includes a general exception under 
Paragraph 1 for occupational requirements which are a proportionate means to 
achieve a legitimate aim: this exception being a reformulation of a well-established 
provision in equality law which applies to all protected characteristics.101 A further 
exception, applicable only to religion or belief is contained in Paragraph 3: an 
employer with an ethos based on religion or belief102 is permitted to discriminate on 
the grounds of religion or belief if it is an occupational requirement for the particular 
post,103 and having regard to that ethos, and the nature or context of the work, the 
application of the requirement is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
100 Academic literature differs in whether to describe the substance of this section as 'exceptions' or 'exemptions'. 
The term ‘exemptions’ is, for instance, preferred by Sandberg and Doe (2007). 
101 Equality Act 2010, schedule 9, para. 1. 
102 Which can be a natural person, in which case determining that they had such an ethos may be easier than for 
a legal person – consider Jivraj v Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, para. 56. A distinction between a 'sole trader' and 
a company was also suggested in Workshop 1, and taken further in Workshop 2 with consideration given to very 
small employers and service providers. 
103 Hender (Louise) v Prospects ET Case no. 2902090/2006; Sheridan (Mark) v Prospects ET Case no. 
2901366/2006, both 13 May 2008. 
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aim. These criteria are determined objectively, that is, it is not sufficient that the 
employer genuinely believe that they apply.104  
The EU Directive provides an exception, for all protected characteristics, where the 
protected characteristic, such as religion or belief, is a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement and it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the 
particular case. This wording was used in the 2003 Regulations and meant that it 
was evident that the exception only applied where there was a very clear connection 
between the work to be done and the characteristics required: the occupational 
requirement had to be genuine and determining. Under this narrow exception, 
religious discrimination was only really likely to be lawful in cases of those employed 
in religious service, whose job involved teaching or promoting the religion, or being 
involved in religious observance. The fact that the religious requirement had to be 
‘determining’ meant that the religious nature of the job must be a defining aspect of 
the job. This could then be contrasted with the slightly wider exception that applies to 
organisations with an ethos based on religion or belief, in which an exception needed 
only to be ‘genuine’ without the requirement that it be ‘determining’. Again, this 
reflects the wording used in the EU Directive. It suggests a less rigorous approach in 
deciding whether the particular job requires a particular characteristic; it might allow 
an employer with an ethos based on religion to require that all staff share the 
religion, even ancillary staff, for whom religion is not a determining requirement. An 
example of the use of the broader exception for religion or belief employers can be 
seen in Muhammed v The Leprosy Mission International,105 where a small Christian 
charity was allowed to refuse applications from non-Christians, because Christianity 
permeated the organisation, with prayers starting each day. Employing a non-
Christian would have had a significant impact on the ability of the organisation to 
maintain its ethos, whereas the finance administrator who was refused a job would 
have had the chance to work elsewhere.  
In the redrafting of the legislation for the Equality Act 2010, the word ‘genuine’ was 
removed from the exceptions contained in Schedule 9, on the basis that it was 
unnecessary (because an occupational requirement which is not genuine is therefore 
not an occupational requirement). Equally, it was assumed that whether the 
requirement was determining or not, would be assessed as part of the review of 
proportionality, and did not need stating in the legislation. As the British legislation 
must be interpreted to accord with the EU Directive, this difference may not be of 
104 Jivraj v Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40. 
105 Muhammad v The Leprosy Mission International, ET 2303459/0989, 16 December 2009. 
 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission · www.equalityhumanrights.com 44 
Published September 2015 
                                            
Review of religion or belief law Balancing rights 
 
 
significance. However, it is arguable that the removal of these terms, particularly the 
term ‘determining’ from the face of the legislation has hidden from view an important 
distinction between the two levels of occupational requirement (Pitt, 2011).  
These occupational requirement provisions are supplemented by specific provisions 
intended to protect religious autonomy. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 9 provides that 
discrimination on grounds of sex, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, marriage to a person of the same sex, and sexual orientation is 
permitted if, among other requirements, it is shown that the employment was for the 
purposes of an organised religion. The requirement must be one that is either being 
applied so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion; or so as to avoid conflicting 
with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s 
followers. There is no express requirement that such discrimination be a 
proportionate means of doing so, although it has been argued that the legislation 
needs to be read in accordance with EU law, and so import a proportionality 
requirement (Donald, 2012: 96). Donald (2012: 94) also notes that the Explanatory 
Notes to this section of the Act go beyond the text of the actual exception. An earlier 
provision had been interpreted by the High Court in R (Amicus – MSF Section) v 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry as needing to be 'construed strictly since it 
is a derogation from the principle of equal treatment',106 although it has been 
interpreted to include a Diocesan Youth Officer on the basis that he would be 
'promoting religion' in addition to simply carrying out youth work.107 During the 
passage of the Act an attempt to provide a definition of 'the purposes of an organised 
religion' failed. The Explanatory Notes reflect some of the rejected definition when 
they stress that the exception was 'intended to cover a very narrow range of 
employment: ministers of religion and a small number of lay posts, including those 
that exist to promote and represent religion'.108 As Sandberg (2011b: 120) has 
pointed out, the exception does not expressly convey this restricted meaning. In 
practice, these Explanatory Notes, together with the emphasis on strict construction 
in Amicus, seem to have led to the continuation of a narrow interpretation.  
106 R (Amicus – MSF Section) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 860 (Admin). 
107 Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance, ET 1602844/06, 17 April 2007. Compare Glasgow City 
Council v McNab [2007] IRLR 476. 
108 Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, para. 790. 
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Exceptions relating to provision of goods and services 
The Equality Act 2010 allows 'organisations relating to a religion' or belief to 
discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief or sexual orientation in the way they 
operate.109 The purpose of such an organisation must be to practise, advance or 
teach a religion or belief, or to enable persons of a religion or belief to receive a 
benefit, or engage in an activity 'within the framework of that religion or belief', or to 
foster or maintain good relations between persons of different religions or belief.110 
The organisation must not have a commercial sole or main purpose.111 Such 
organisations may restrict, on discriminatory grounds in relation to religion or belief 
or sexual orientation, membership of the organisation, participation in its activities, 
use of its premises, or 'the provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of 
activities undertaken by the organisation'.112 Such a restriction in relation to religion 
or belief must be imposed either because of the purposes of the organisation, or to 
avoid causing offence on grounds of its religion or belief to persons of that religion or 
belief.113 Such a restriction in relation to sexual orientation must be imposed either 
because it is necessary to comply with the doctrine of the organisation, or to avoid 
conflict with strongly held convictions of a significant number of followers of its 
religion or belief.114 Additionally, the Equality Act 2010 allows ministers of an 
organised religion to provide a service only to persons of one sex or to separate 
services for persons of each sex.115 This must be necessary to comply with the 
doctrines of the religion, or be for the purpose of avoiding conflict with the strongly 
held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers. 
The sexual orientation exception does not apply when the organisation has 
contracted with a public authority to provide a service on its behalf. This has led to 
litigation where a religiously based adoption agency wished to exclude same-sex 
couples from their processes (Donald, 2012: 100-01).116  
The EHRC call for evidence identifies some examples of concerns over service 
provision with a religious element (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 76-77). With regard 
109 Equality Act 2010 schedule 23, para. 2. 
110 Ibid, para. 23(1). 
111 Ibid, para. 23(2).  
112 Ibid, para. 23(3). 
113 Ibid, para. 23(6). 
114 Ibid, para. 23(7). 
115 Equality Act 2010 schedule 3, para. 29. 
116 Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales (2012) FTC/52/2011. See 
also Re J and S (Children) [2014] EWFC 4.  
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to service providers which were not organisations relating to religion or belief,117 
some were concerned that equality law was 'stifling' religious views they saw as 
integral to the way that they worked, while others were concerned that the imposition 
of religious views of the provider could be upsetting to both staff and service users 
(Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 97). 
The recent decision in a Northern Ireland County Court case, Ashers Baking 
Company, could have a significant influence on the British law.118 In May 2015, the 
court found that it was unlawful direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
for a bakery owned by two Christians to refuse to bake a cake which had printed on 
it a picture of 'Bert and Ernie' and the caption 'Support Gay Marriage' (Henderson, 
2015). The significance and implications of the case will only become clear once 
there has been a final determination on appeal. 
Issues 
Discussion of exceptions has tended, as in Ashers Baking Company, to turn on 
discrimination because of sexual orientation. Individuals and organisations motivated 
by religion or belief may, however, seek to justify discrimination on other grounds, for 
instance sex or disability (Edge, 2011). Some commentators have suggested that 
the law on exceptions creates '… a varied and sometimes confusing patchwork of 
law' (Pearce (2013: 82)) as different exceptions apply in relation to discrimination 
because ofreligion or belief, sexual orientation, sex, and disability for instance. The 
exceptions for employment and service provision also differ. This has led to the 
suggestion by some commentators that the current exceptions should be replaced 
by an alternative model based on the theory of religious autonomy, a concept 
recognised by human rights law,119 (Leigh, 2013).  
An approach which began in religious autonomy, particularly if religious autonomy 
were to be framed as a fundamental right rather than as a privilege granted by the 
state, as in the US,120 might work differently. An autonomy based exception could 
well be broader than the current law, for instance in allowing religious organisations 
117 Equality Act 2010 schedule 23, para.2. 
118 Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd and McArthur and McArthur (2015), County Court of Northern Ireland 19 May 
2015 (online at http://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Cases%20and%20Settlements/2015/Lee-v-
Ashers_Judgement.pdf). 
119 For instance by the ECtHR in Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria, app. 30985/96; Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v 
Ukraine, app. 77703/01; Sindicatul “Pastorul cel Bun” v Romania, app. 3220/09. 
120 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 
US (2012). 
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to discriminate more than the current law allows in favour of co-religionists in order to 
create mono-religious workplaces. Some participants in the workshops considered 
that an approach which resulted in more extensive exceptions would be 
unacceptable, striking the wrong balance between religious rights to autonomy and 
the right to be protected from discrimination. 
A particular issue where autonomy has been seen as particularly relevant has been 
referred to internationally as the 'ministerial exception',121 under which the 
relationship between a minister of religion, however defined, and their religious 
organisation is treated differently from a normal employment relationship. In Great 
Britain, this scenario has been dealt with by applications of broader doctrines to the 
problem: a distinction between office holder and employee so as to exclude the 
operation of a contract of employment; a distinction between the intention to create 
legal relations in a normal agreement, and an agreement between a minister and 
their religious organisation, so as to exclude the operation of any legal contract; and 
a distinction between normal services and religious services, so as to exclude the 
latter from a legal agreement. All have proven unstable, and have largely been 
rejected by the courts (Edge, 2015). British courts have begun to make some use of 
concepts of the autonomy of religious organisations under Article 9 of the ECHR,122 
but have yet to fully explore the implications of religious organisation autonomy 
(Hatzis, 2013). 
There is significant, but not universal, consensus that the autonomy of religious 
organisations justifies some departure from the norms of equality law (Mitchell and 
Beninger, 2015: 134; Laborde, 2014a). There is notably less consensus on how wide 
the definition of religious organisation should be. Some respondents to the EHRC 
call for evidence were concerned that individuals who sought to run a business in 
accordance with their faith were treated in law as businesses, rather than entitled to 
a religious exception to the normal rules (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 144). The 
discussion in Workshop 2 reflected significant differences of opinion as to whether 
individuals operating businesses should be considered for any exception to normal 
duties on the grounds of religion or belief. 
As discussed above, the current law provides a broader range of exceptions to 
normal equality law duties to religious organisations whose main purpose is not 
commercial. The application of religious rights arguments to commercial 
121 This topic is discussed in comparative perspective in an issue of the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
currently at press; see chapters by Slotte and Årsheim; Svensson; Edge; Garcimartín; and Christoffersen.  
122 e.g. New Testament Church of God v Stewart [2007] EWCA Civ 1004, CA. 
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organisations with legal personality has been given greater prominence by the 
decision of the US Supreme Court in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.123 In that 
high profile case, a for-profit corporation owned by family members, with a well-
documented religious ethos, was found to possess religious rights which could be 
upheld against obligations to provide particular types of healthcare to employees.124  
In UK tax law, there has been a willingness to afford religious rights to a company 
which is an extension of a person, or potentially a group of persons’125 as well as to 
treat the normal work of a church as 'conducted on commercial principles' so that 
use of a church 'constituted a trade'.126 It is not clear how far this convergence of the 
commercial and the religious in 'commercial religion' (Edge, 2013) will be applied to 
for-profit organisations in relation to employment law and the provision of services. In 
Ashers Baking Company, for instance, Judge Brownlie considered that '…a limited 
company cannot invoke Article 9 rights',127 but accepted that individuals engaged in 
commerce could, although she found that they could not 'manifest them in the 
commercial sphere if contrary to the rights of others.128 
 
  
123 Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc (2014) 573 US. 
124 For a recent, but notably less clear, consideration of related issues under the ECHR, see Firma EDV fur Sie v 
Germany, App. No. 32783/08 (2 September 2014), para. 31. 
125 Exmoor Coast Boat Cruises Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2014] UKFTT 1103 (TC). 
126 Senex Investments Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenues and Customs, [2015] UKFTT 0107, 
para. 94. 
127 Ashers Baking Co Ltd, para. 98. 
128 Ibid, para. 94. 
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5 | A duty of reasonable accommodation  
Commentators frequently question whether the law would be improved by 
introducing a ‘duty of reasonable accommodation’ for religion or belief (Alidadi, 2012; 
Gibson, 2013; Howard, 2013; Henrard, 2012). This issue was also extensively 
discussed in the four workshops. Those who support the introduction of such a duty 
believe that it would overcome the difficulties that face individuals wishing to bring 
claims of indirect discrimination, as there would be no need to show group 
disadvantage, and that it would be simpler and more appropriate to use in the work 
context than indirect discrimination (discussed by Bribosia et al, 2010; Vickers, 2008: 
220-25). Precedent for this approach can be found domestically as well as in other 
jurisdictions. In Great Britain, employers and service providers are subject to a ‘duty 
of reasonable adjustment’, requiring them to make adjustments necessary to working 
practices, premises or services to remove any disadvantage faced by disabled 
people; this requires a disadvantage to be shown which the reasonable adjustment 
is intended to address.129 It should be noted that the workshops discussed whether 
comparisons between the duty to accommodate and the duty to make reasonable 
adjustments is apt (Waddington and Hendriks, 2002). 
In the USA and Canada (Gibson, 2013; Moon, 2006; Stychin, 2009), a duty is placed 
on employers to accommodate the religious practices of employees, as long as this 
does not cause undue hardship to the employer. However, although the US and 
Canadian laws both have such a duty, in practice they are applied somewhat 
differently, because a different standard of review is used in assessing whether an 
accommodation is reasonable or not. For example, in the US, although the duty to 
accommodate exists, the duty is very easily fulfilled: if the employer will be caused 
even minimal hardship by accommodating the employee’s religion (for example in 
terms of cost or the dissatisfaction of other staff members) then the duty will not 
apply.130 In effect, once a competing interest is identified, the duty on the employer 
tends to give way (Prenkert and Magid, 2006). Nonetheless, the duty does require 
that an employer makes some attempt at accommodation: although only minimal 
129 Equality Act 2010, S 20.  
130 Trans World Airlines v Hardison (1977) 432 US 63. 
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hardship is required, there must at least be actual hardship, not merely hypothetical 
(Gibson, 2013).131  
In Canada, a higher standard of review is used. Again, the employer must comply 
with the duty reasonably to accommodate unless accommodation would cause 
undue hardship. Whereas the US has taken a minimal approach to the issue of 
hardship, the Canadian courts have required employers to accommodate where 
possible, and have listed examples of criteria to be considered in assessing whether 
the duty has been met. These include financial cost, the size of the employer, and 
the nature of the employee’s job.132 In assessing whether it would be reasonable for 
the employer to accommodate a religious employee’s request, courts balance the 
competing interests and use the principle of proportionality to reach their 
conclusions.  
There is nothing in the existing law which prevents an employer making an 
accommodation, unless doing so would breach discrimination law or health and 
safety legislation. In some respects, the protection provided by a duty of 
accommodation does not materially differ from that provided by indirect 
discrimination. A failure to accommodate a request by religious employees for 
different treatment may amount to indirect discrimination, unless the refusal to 
accommodate can be justified. For example, where an employer refuses a request 
that a work uniform be adapted to accommodate religious practice, religious 
employees would suffer indirect discrimination. The employer’s requirement that staff 
wear the uniform would put those members of staff at a particular disadvantage, and 
the requirement would need to be justified. Similarly, depending upon the legal 
framework, a request for time off for religious observance could be framed as a 
request for accommodation, which could only be denied on reasonable grounds; or it 
could be framed as an indirect discrimination claim: that the requirement to work 
particular hours puts the religious individual at a disadvantage, and must be justified.  
Whether such an approach would be beneficial in Europe and Great Britain has been 
the subject of much debate (Alidadi, 2012; Hepple et al, 2000; Gibson, 2013; 
Loenen, 2012).133 The EU funded project RELIGARE recommended that a duty of 
reasonable accommodation for religion and belief be introduced in EU law (Foblets 
131 EEOC v Alamo Rent-A-Car (2006) 432 F.Supp.2d 1006 (2006).  
132 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission) (Alberta ) [1990] 2 SCR 489. 
133 See also the chapters in part II section II of Foblets et al (2014) by Ast, Cumper, Henrard, Laborde and Stein; 
see also the 2014 interim report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Religion and Belief, which focussed on tackling 
religious intolerance and discrimination in the workplace available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/A.69.261.pdf. (Accessed: 27 August 2015). 
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and Alidadi, 2013, particularly the chapters in part 2), and similar suggestions have 
been made by commentators in Great Britain (Christians in Parliament, 2012; 
Gibson, 2013), as well as by some participants in the workshops. As noted above, it 
is generally recognised that the current law on indirect discrimination does largely 
provide similar protection to that which a duty of reasonable accommodation would 
provide: a failure to accommodate a request for different treatment by religious 
employees may amount to indirect discrimination, unless the refusal to 
accommodate can be justified.  
This understanding of the links between reasonable accommodation and indirect 
discrimination has some judicial backing, with the acceptance in the service 
provision case of Hall and Preddy that failure to make a reasonable accommodation 
may be evidence that a refusal to change a requirement is disproportionate.134 In 
effect, whether using a reasonable accommodation model or an indirect 
discrimination model, the question for the court depends largely upon the 
assessment of whether it would be proportionate in the particular case to 
accommodate the religious employee given the different competing interests at 
stake. The outcome of that assessment will depend more upon the standard of 
review chosen than on the model used, as is shown by the difference in approach 
between the US and Canada, both of which are based on the reasonable 
accommodation model.  
Although both systems rely largely on an assessment of reasonableness or 
proportionality, an additional difference between an approach based on indirect 
discrimination and one based on reasonable accommodation relates to the burden of 
proof. In indirect discrimination the employee must first show that a requirement 
creates a disadvantage. The burden then shifts to the employer to justify the 
requirement. In contrast, with a duty of reasonable accommodation, the employee 
just needs to request the accommodation, and the employer will need to show that 
any accommodation would create unreasonable hardship. This suggests that the 
burden on the employee to prove the case would be easier. However, of itself this 
would not necessarily mean that the creation of a duty of reasonable accommodation 
would be of benefit to religious employees. This is because the level of protection 
provided by a duty of reasonable accommodation turns largely on how easy it is for 
employers to justify a refusal to accommodate. If all that is needed is minimal 
hardship to the employer (for example the fact that other staff could be 
134 'I am more than ready to accept that the scope for reasonable accommodation is part of the proportionality 
assessment, at least in some cases'. Lady Hale, Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73, para. 47.  
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inconvenienced) before refusal to accommodate is justified, the protection would not 
be very strong.  
The question remains whether a change to British law to introduce a duty of 
reasonable accommodation would improve the effectiveness of the legal protection 
for religion and belief. As the experience of the US and Canada show, the use of a 
legal framework based on a duty of accommodation does not of itself increase the 
level of protection: instead this is determined by the standard the courts apply in 
assessing whether a refusal of an accommodation was reasonable.  
Arguments in favour of creating a duty of reasonable accommodation  
The first argument in favour of an approach based on reasonable accommodation is 
that such a duty would apply to individuals as much as groups, and so would 
overcome the difficulty potentially caused to individual claimants by the current lack 
of clarity, discussed above, over whether there is a requirement in indirect 
discrimination cases for group disadvantage.  
Second, the creation of a separate duty of reasonable accommodation would create 
clarity for individuals with a religion or belief. It would be clear that employees have 
the right to ask for accommodation, and this could lead to more cases being dealt 
with at a workplace level, without recourse to courts.  
Moreover, as discussed in the workshops, it may be that for an employee to make a 
religion or belief request to their employer would feel more comfortable and less 
confrontational than for them to allege that their employer has discriminated against 
them. Some workshop participants thought that the creation of a duty of reasonable 
accommodation might lead to more open dialogue about religion or belief in the 
workplace, a reduction in litigation and greater satisfaction with the legal framework. 
However, it could also be the case that, at least in the short-term, any change in the 
law would result in an increase in litigation seeking to determine the boundaries of 
what is ‘reasonable’. 
Other concerns are more technical and relate to how the creation of a separate duty 
would affect the interpretation of equality law more generally, and the protection 
afforded in relation to other protected characteristics (Stuart, forthcoming). The 
concern arises because of the usual practice of applying the same standards of 
justification across all strands of equality law. The standard applied is very strict: the 
means chosen for achieving that legitimate aim must correspond to a real need on 
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the part of the undertaking, must be appropriate with a view to achieving the 
objective in question and must be necessary to that end.135 For example, increased 
costs alone or inconvenience would not be acceptable as justification for indirect sex 
discrimination.  
However, it is arguable that in cases involving manifestation of religion or belief, the 
standard of justification has been less strict, and that this may affect the standard 
used for other grounds, a process known as ‘levelling down’ (Loenen, 2012; Loenen 
and Vickers, 2015). For example, if an employer can refuse to allow time off work for 
religious observance and then justify this on grounds of economic cost, they might 
also be able to justify refusing a request relating to sex or race discrimination. This 
could lead to a reduction in the current levels of protection under the Equality Act for 
these protected characteristics.  
One benefit of a separate duty of reasonable accommodation for religion or belief, 
therefore, is that it may remove the risk of ‘levelling down’ in this way. This is 
because the separate legal framework for religion or belief cases would provide a 
way for different levels of legal protection to be set as seems appropriate for the 
particular context of religion or belief. This would remove the danger of ‘cross 
fertilisation’ into other areas of equality law, where standards have been developed 
in a different context.  
Arguments against creating a duty of reasonable accommodation  
A number of arguments against creating a duty of reasonable accommodation can 
be identified (see Pitt, 2013). First, such a duty might be seen to privilege religion or 
belief over other protected characteristics for which there is no similar duty with the 
exception of disability, which importantly can be distinguished by the asymmetrical 
nature of the protection from discrimination. It is not unlawful to treat a disabled 
person more favourably than a non-disabled person because of disability, whereas 
accommodating one religion or belief might result in less favourable treatment of 
another. Second, the absence of a clear definition of belief means that creating a 
duty of accommodation for religion or belief could lead to significant uncertainty for 
employers. For example, it is unclear how far employers would be expected to go to 
accommodate some of the beliefs that have been found to be covered by the 
legislation, such as a belief that public service broadcasting has a higher purpose,136 
135 Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607-1631 [1986], para. 607. 
136 Maistry v BBC, ET Case No.1313142/10, 29 March 2011. 
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or that foxhunting is wrong.137 Third, a duty to accommodate may imply a default 
position that employers should attempt to accommodate, whereas the indirect 
discrimination protection does not have such an underlying assumption.  
In addition, another set of arguments can be made based more on the symbolic 
effect of the creation of a duty. The creation of a separate duty may not lead to 
substantial change in the level of protection for religion and belief over and above 
that already provided by indirect discrimination (see Chapter 4). Indeed, whether or 
not any such duty did have any substantial impact would depend on where the 
threshold of ‘reasonable’ was set. However, explicitly treating religion or belief 
differently from other protected characteristics would have a significant symbolic 
effect, as it would mark religion and belief out as having special status. This was a 
main concern of workshop participants who thought that if religion or belief received 
special treatment in comparison with other protected characteristics, those might 
then be perceived as less important. Some workshop participants considered that 
any duty of accommodation should not be extended to apply to service providers, 
nor should it be possible for an employer to argue that they have accommodated a 
request as part of their defence against a claim of direct discrimination. Moreover, 
some participants who were opposed to the introduction of a duty of reasonable 
accommodation suggested that the use of the language of a ‘duty’ would imply a 
positive obligation and that this could create a prima facie expectation that the 
accommodation would be granted. These participants felt that this could exert 
pressure on employers to accommodate requests which would give excessive 
weight to religious interests in the workplace. 
Some participants in the workshops suggested an alternative to a duty to 
accommodate, which could meet some of these concerns. They argued that a right 
to request accommodation of religion or belief in the workplace, analogous to the 
current right to request flexible working, could be introduced.138 The right to request 
flexible working provides a legal right to make the request and the employer has to 
consider the request in a reasonable manner. The application requires those making 
a request to provide an explanation of how they think flexible working might affect 
the business, as well as how this could be dealt with. Although this right is not 
especially strong, and making such a request has always been possible in any 
event, it does encourage employers and staff to think about flexible working, and 
137 Hashman v Milton Park Dorset Ltd (t/a Orchard Park), ET Case No. 3105555, 4 March 2011. 
138 See https://www.gov.uk/flexible-working/overview. (Accessed: 27 August 2015). 
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requires employers to give some consideration to requests made (Anderson, 2003; 
Weldon-Johns, 2011).  
The right to request flexible working applies to all staff, and can be used by those 
seeking a change to working hours to accommodate needs based on religion or 
belief. The suggestion from the workshops was to extend the right to include a right 
to request other forms of accommodation, such as a request to adapt a work uniform 
to comply with religious rules, or a request to opt out of certain work tasks. Although 
the right to request would be fairly weak (requiring only that employers consider the 
request in a reasonable manner), this could also be seen as an advantage  
The limited nature of the right would mean that it would not be providing extensive 
special treatment for religion or belief, but nonetheless, the existence of the right 
might make it easier for employees to make requests and could facilitate open and 
non-confrontational discussion between employer and employee. However, the 
concern remained that, as with the creation of a duty of accommodation, the creation 
of a ‘right to request accommodation’ would still mark religion or belief as having 
special status. Moreover, a further concern was that the creation of a right to request 
'reasonable' accommodation for religion or belief might lead to a risk of conflicting 
standards as between the right as it applies to religion, and the right to request 
flexible working for other workers. For example, employers may need guidance on 
how to resolve competing demands for time off from those with family or caring 
needs, and those with religion or belief based reasons for requesting time off (ACAS, 
2014b).139 
139 ACAS guidance on how to handle matters fairly when facing multiple requests for flexible working includes 
considering some form of random selection if unable to distinguish between all the requests; or calling for 
volunteers from existing flexible workers to change their hours to create capacity. 
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6 | The public sector equality duty 
Under the Equality Act 2010, the public sector equality duties that had existed for 
race, gender and disability were consolidated into a single duty. This duty was 
extended to apply also to religion or belief, age, sexual orientation, gender 
reassignment, and pregnancy and maternity. The equality duty is one of the key 
ways in which the Equality Act 2010 aims to strengthen the law to support progress 
on equality (Fredman, 2011). The duty has three aims. Public authorities must have 
due regard to the need to (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and 
any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Act; (b) advance equality of 
opportunity between persons who share a [religion or belief] and persons who do not 
share it; and (c) foster good relations between persons who share a [religion or 
belief] and persons who do not share it.140 
Guidance on what is required to comply with the duty is provided by the EHRC’s 
guidance materials, including its technical guidance (EHRC, 2014a, b, c). Although a 
number of cases brought before the courts have been unsuccessful in overturning 
the decisions of public bodies (Bell, 2010; Fredman, 2011, 2014), nonetheless, case 
law has developed the understanding of what is required by the duty to have ‘due 
regard’. Moreover, there is evidence that many public sector organisations have put 
in place processes to try to promote equality in the workplace and in the provision of 
their services, as part of a process of integrating equality into day to day practice 
(Clayton-Hathway, 2013; Government Equalities Office, 2013). The evidence of the 
impact of the duty on public sector organisations is also echoed by findings of the 
EHRC call for evidence (Mitchell and Beninger, 2015: 129) and was discussed in 
Workshop 2. Despite these positive views of the impact of the PSED, some 
commentators have expressed concern about the extension of the public sector duty 
to religion or belief (Lester and Uccellari, 2008: 570: Vickers, 2011; Woodhead with 
Catto, 2009). They suggest that public sector bodies need to be careful to consider 
how best to respect the interests of those who would prefer that religion be kept out 
of the public sphere. In addition, they should not assume that accommodating 
140 Equality Act 2010, S149. 
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majority versions of religious faiths will be sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
duty. However, Malik has noted that ‘merely consulting with religion or belief groups 
does not mean that public authorities have to implement all of the demands of such 
groups; and consultation or accommodation does not in itself breach the principle of 
secularism which is a principle that applies to the institutional separation of religion 
and state (Malik, 2008). Some of the goals of the PSED may be met by retaining a 
focus on ensuring participation and consultation when developing policy. Experience 
of the similar duties in Northern Ireland (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 
2012), although in a rather different political context, suggests that it is important to 
encourage consultation with religion and belief organisations before and during the 
design of public policy. Used proactively, the public sector equality duty in Great 
Britain can provide an impetus to consult widely with stakeholders in the design of 
public policies, and can encourage religion and belief groups to engage in dialogue 
with other groups. This may help minimise or resolve potential conflicts before they 
become entrenched. Mainstreaming equality into everyday practice, by ensuring that 
processes of consultation, negotiation and compromise are developed, can 
contribute to social cohesion and help to minimise conflict between different groups 
(Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2012). 
Much of the research on the impact of the public sector equality duty in practice 
(Government Equalities Office, 2013) has focussed on the duty in general, or on 
other grounds rather than on the duty as it applies to religion or belief. More research 
on how the duty has been implemented with regard to religion or belief would help 
determine its practical effectiveness in this area.  
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Appendices | 
EHRC stakeholder workshops 
Workshop One: Oxford Brookes University, 27 November 2014 
Participants 
Sue Coe, Clare Collier, Professor Peter Edge, William Garnier, Dr Don Horrocks, Dr 
Erica Howard, Associate Professor Tarunabh Khaitan, Dr Megan Pearson, Dr Dave 
Perfect, Professor Gwyneth Pitt, David Pollock, Caroline Roberts, Macca 
Teclehaimanot, Emeritus Professor Roger Trigg, Professor Lucy Vickers, Professor 
Paul Weller.  
Summary of discussion 
The workshop started with introductions and a brief description of the project. The 
purpose of this event was to examine what is protected under the law on religion or 
belief. This would include both an overview of the legal protection and an 
assessment of current practical experiences of religious discrimination. This would 
cover the fundamental definitional issues, and also the characteristics that flow from 
basing claims on freedom of religion as opposed to religious equality.  
We framed the discussion around three short presentations: an overview of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Articles 9 and 14) and the Equality Act 2010, including 
recent case law such as Eweida and Others v UK (2013) App. 48420/10 and Bull v 
Hall [2013] UKSC 73; a discussion of the definition of religion and belief in English 
law, including outside of equality law such as R (on the application of Hodkin and 
Another v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77; and a 
discussion of the use of equality or human rights frameworks to approach the issues.  
In the subsequent discussion, participants questioned the distinction between belief 
and manifestation; how clear is the difference between sincerely believing in 
something and manifesting that belief? And is there a distinction between affirming 
or stating one’s faith, and manifesting it? If so, to what extent can it be limited? The 
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right to believe something cannot be limited although manifestation of that belief can 
be, yet it was suggested that it can be problematic to distinguish between the two in 
practice. In particular it was suggested that affirmation of beliefs might be understood 
more as akin to the holding of the belief, rather than as a manifestation of that belief. 
Some participants suggested that proselytisation, as opposed to affirmation, had an 
element of targeting of another person, and should be treated as a manifestation. 
In relation to manifestation, some participants felt strongly that the current legal 
structures prioritised particular forms of religious experience, with religions with a 
functional requirement (e.g. a prayer room) being easier to identify and seek 
accommodation for than a requirement that an individual not be complicit in an 
activity contrary to their conscience – Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1357 was cited as an example of this. Some contributors saw a 
disjunction between religion or belief and other protected characteristics because of 
the intellectual content. There was some distinction drawn between illegal and legal 
manifestations of belief. 
We discussed the place of the state, particularly the state seeking to be neutral 
between religions. Participants discussed the difficulty of the state determining what 
belief should be protected, as well as the legitimacy of the state distinguishing 
between different religious beliefs, and the implications of looking at religions by 
reference to majoritarian stances within a particular religious community. There was 
a general consensus that the difficult cases in this area had been on philosophical 
beliefs which were not comprehensive worldviews – Maistry v BBC (2012) ET no. 
1313142/10 was cited as an example. Some participants suggested that it may be 
better to test sincerity of beliefs, with courts recognising only genuinely held beliefs, 
rather than determining whether a belief system counts as a belief at all. Some 
contributors noted the change in the law with the removal of 'similar' from the 
statutory definition, although it was not suggested that this change had much 
practical effect.  
We discussed the implications of treating Article 9 as a group right, or an individual 
right. Participants noted that Article 9 recognises freedom of religion and belief as a 
group right. This had been discussed by the Court of Appeal in Mba v London 
Borough of Merton [2013] EWCA Civ 1562 with the judges considering that group 
disadvantage was not covered under the Equality Act. Participants noted that the 
size of any disadvantaged group can be relevant to the question of indirect 
discrimination in different ways; if there is only one person disadvantaged, it may be 
easier to accommodate their views, whereas this may not be feasible for a larger 
group.  
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Some contributors felt that the current law, with the emphasis on individual rights, did 
not properly consider the social side of religion and the importance of institutions to 
religious freedom. A slightly different theme was whether the size of a service 
provider should also be relevant, with some suggestion that a sole trader may be 
more entitled to consideration of their religious views in providing services than a 
large company. 
Within the discussions, there was some emphasis on the importance of law acting to 
smooth relationships and dialogue between differently placed individuals, and some 
concern that the legal framework was not an effective tool to solve problems, 
because it emphasised conflict and reliance upon rights. There was also a concern 
by some contributors, though not all that the law was not being applied evenly 
between different belief systems. There was some discussion of burden sharing, with 
some contributors seeing a difference between an employee whose duties have 
changed, who should be entitled to special consideration, and an employee who 
joins a concern knowing what will be required of them. 
Some participants suggested that recognition of protected characteristics in relation 
to those providing a service was not as advanced as in those receiving a service; for 
example they suggested that the religious beliefs of service providers should be 
taken into account so as to excuse them from offering services to all, on the basis of 
their religious belief. Others felt that the interests of those receiving services, 
especially public services, should be given more weight. There was some discussion 
of the importance of looking at the impact of a management decision in favour of an 
individual employer in relation to other members of the workplace, as well as 
customers and service users.  
Some contributors suggested that tactically, a claimant was better off relying upon 
the Equality Act rather than the Human Rights Act. Indirect discrimination was seen 
as key to claims here. An issue that arose from this was whether indirect 
discrimination could be relied upon where only one person was affected. There was 
some agreement that a group may be easier to find than first appeared, but citing 
Mba, there was a feeling that an individual who could not do this may find their case 
difficult to bring. Reasonable accommodation, perhaps as an alternative to indirect 
discrimination, or perhaps as a supplement, was discussed – there was no 
consensus that this was a good way forward. Supporters of the idea noted that a 
request for reasonable accommodation might seem less confrontational when made 
to an employer, in comparison with a claim that the employer is indirectly 
discriminating against the employee. Opponents to extending this concept from 
disability to religion or belief were concerned that it would privilege religion and belief 
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over other characteristics, such as sexual orientation; or that it would place an undue 
financial burden on employers. 
Workshop Two: King’s College London, 7 January 2015. 
Participants 
Angela Brierley, Jennifer Crook, Sam Dick, Professor Peter Edge, Stephen Evans, 
Sue Ferris, Abigail Fitzgibbon, Dr Myriam Hunter-Henin, Emeritus Professor Peter 
Jones, Professor Maleiha Malik, Andrew Marsh, Professor Aileen McColgan, Alan 
Murray, Dr Yossi Nehushtan, Macelle Palmer, Dr Dave Perfect, Quinn Roache, Dr 
Russell Sandberg, Dr Jonathan Seglow, Macca Teclehaimanot, Professor Lucy 
Vickers, Professor Paul Weller, Graeme Wilson, Professor Rob Wintemute. 
Summary of discussion 
We introduced the Workshop with a brief description of the project. The purpose of 
this event was to explore two issues: reasonable accommodation and the religion or 
belief exceptions under the Equality Act. We framed discussion around two short 
presentations: one on reasonable accommodation, particularly in the context of 
existing law on indirect discrimination, and the public sector equality duty; and one 
on exemptions to equality law obligations.  
In the subsequent discussion, participants did not agree on whether a duty of 
reasonable accommodation would be a desirable development of the law. Some 
contributors felt that such a duty would make no difference to individual cases from 
the current indirect discrimination framework, although the reasoning may be 
expressed differently; while others felt it would make a difference in some cases. 
Others felt that this would give more weight to religion or belief over other rights, and 
there was strong difference of opinion as to whether this was desirable, with some 
participants being fundamentally opposed to a duty to accommodate on principle, 
rather than because of concerns over the difficulty of effective implementation of 
such a duty.  
The focus of discussion was on reasonable accommodation of employees’ religion or 
belief, and this was seen as a weakness in the current debate by some contributors. 
Some participants suggested that users of services may also need to be reasonably 
accommodated in terms of religion or belief, with Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73 being 
given an example.  
 
 
Equality and Human Rights Commission · www.equalityhumanrights.com 72 
Published September 2015  
Review of religion or belief law Appendices 
 
Some contributors expressed concern that open dialogue was not taking place 
between religious groups and individuals and others about equality, particularly in 
relation to sexuality. A duty of reasonable accommodation, if it encouraged better 
discussions between different parties, could be beneficial.  
Participants also discussed the issue of proportionality, particularly in relation to the 
meaning of the term 'reasonable'. Some contributors were concerned that the impact 
of equality law on employers and service providers, particularly very small ones, was 
not currently given sufficient weight. Some contributors expressed concern that a duty 
to reasonably accommodate would replace current vagueness in indirect 
discrimination with similar vagueness over 'reasonable'. Others were keen to ensure 
that applying such a test took account of the full range of people who would be 
affected by a decision to make a particular accommodation, including those suffering 
harm to their dignity. This would also include the interests of users of services, 
particularly public services aimed at supporting vulnerable people. Others, looking at 
the US experience in particular, felt that the limits of 'reasonable' may be set very low.  
One possible path of development emerging from the discussion was the 
introduction of a right to request accommodation of religion or belief in the 
workplace, analogous to the current right to request flexible working. There was no 
consensus on whether such a right to request would make any practical difference to 
individual cases, although it was suggested that the right might make the discussion 
between employer and employee more open and less confrontational. An alternative 
view of the impact on discussion was that a right to request would make such 
requests unusual, rather than part of the normal running of a good workplace. As 
with the discussion of a duty to accommodate, some participants were concerned 
that it would mark religion or belief as special: one contributor opposed such a right 
to request, but if it was introduced would like to see it introduced for all protected 
characteristics. 
Participants discussed the models that would be drawn upon in any duty to 
reasonably accommodate: they noted the existence of international models, and 
expressed some scepticism as to whether current UK disability law was a good 
starting point.  
In relation to exemptions, there was some discussion of the importance of autonomy 
to religious organisations, and a suggestion that exemptions could strike a balance 
between generally applicable equality values and this autonomy. There was some 
recognition that exceptions, or the lack of exceptions, could influence internal 
debates within religious organisations which needed to be recognised as diverse, 
with their own power structures. The sort of organisations which could rely upon 
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such exceptions was also contested, with some discussion of the US case of Burwell 
v Hobby Lobby 573 US (2014). Participants also noted that exceptions do already 
apply to direct discrimination, and that this needed to be particularly scrutinised – 
one commentator suggested that there was not so much a hierarchy of protected 
characteristics, but a hierarchy of direct and indirect discrimination, with direct 
discrimination being given greater protection than indirect discrimination. 
The range of any such exception was the subject of considerable disagreement. 
Some contributors felt that there needed to be a clear link between the religious ethos 
of the organisation and its use of an exemption, so that only those organisations, or 
roles, actively promoting a religion or belief could have recourse to an exception. 
Others phrased a similar idea in terms of 'centrality' of the religion or belief ethos to 
the challenged actions of the organisation, and wished that any exemptions should be 
interpreted narrowly. An alternative view was that exceptions were crucial to the 
autonomy of religious organisations, and the fair treatment of religious individuals, 
and needed to be interpreted broadly enough to fulfil this function. 
A particular focus of the exemptions discussion was the education sector, both in 
relation to faith schools and the employment of teachers. There was also some 
discussion of religious ethos higher education institutions, with a reference to 
ongoing litigation between Trinity Western University in Canada, which has a 
religious ethos, and the Ontario Law Society, which has refused to accredit the 
University’s Law School. 
Workshop Three: King’s College London, 12 January 2015. 
Participants 
Mark Barrell, Alan Beazley, Sally Brett, Paul Deemer, Nick De Marco, Nick Denys, 
Dr Moira Dustin, Professor Peter Edge, Susan Ferris, QC Karon Monaghan, Dr Dave 
Perfect, Sir Bernard Rix, Quinn Roach, Catriona Robertson, Dr Russell Sandberg, 
John Scriven, Jennifer Laurent Smart, Macca Teclehaimanot, Dr Cheryl Chin, 
Professor Lucy Vickers, Professor Paul Weller, Dianah Worman. 
Summary of discussion 
We introduced the Workshop with a description of the overall purpose of the project. 
The review of the effectiveness and interpretation of religion or belief law formed part 
of an EHRC programme of work, which also included its call for evidence on religion 
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or belief in the workplace and service delivery. This Workshop would focus on the 
experiences of stakeholders and practitioners.  
We framed discussion around three short presentations: on the 2013 report on belief, 
discrimination and equality in England and Wales led by Professor Paul Weller; the 
difficulties of minimising bias in the application of law to the area of religion or belief; 
and the experience of presenting religion or belief cases in the courts. 
Stakeholders disagreed as to the extent of religion or belief problems compared with 
other areas of equality law, with one contributor describing cases which had 
appeared before tribunals as 'the tip of the iceberg', and another indicating that 
religion or belief cases may be more commonly represented in these formal cases 
than more established grounds (such as discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy). 
Participants discussed the effect of high profile cases on public understanding of the 
area, and suggested that very specific cases could be taken out of context and given 
a broader significance than lawyers or scholars would attach to them. 
Participants discussed the limitations of law to deal with issues around religion or 
belief, and in particular the possibility that the legal developments in the early 21st 
century had created high expectations. Law was placed in a broader framework of 
education, training, and cultural change. The different approach of different religious 
traditions to law was discussed, in particular the possibility that some groups may 
have religious objections to involving the state in disputes. 
As part of this, the difficulties judges face if they seek to engage with complex issues 
of religious doctrine were alluded to. There was some suggestion that this was 
because of the relative newness of protection on these grounds, and so the courts 
were being conservative in their interpretation of the protection. There was also 
some suggestion that judges needed more religious literacy to properly engage with 
this area: R (E) v Governing Body of Jewish Free School and Others [2009] UKSC 
15 was cited as an example. There was some suggestion that foundational issues of 
the relationship of religion to the state were not being worked through in this area of 
law, with a focus on individual cases and situations. 
Some participants discussed alternatives to what was seen as an adversarial legal 
process. These contributors emphasised discussion, and the hearing of a range of 
voices, as the best way to deal with difficult issues. Some contributors saw the 
contribution of a range of voices to decision makers as a good in itself. 
Participants discussed how religion or belief fitted in with other protected 
characteristics, including race in relation to those religious communities which were 
also categorised as racial groups in English law. Some contributors put forward a 
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possible distinction between religion or belief and other grounds, with the former 
being different because of the possibility that manifesting religion or belief could 
impact on other people: Eweida et al was discussed as an example of this. 
The specificity of particular workplaces was raised in relation to both medical staff 
and teachers. 
We discussed the possibility of a right to request accommodation, which had arisen 
during discussion in Workshop 2. There was no consensus. Some contributors felt 
that it would be too easy for employers to turn down requests, and this might 
exacerbate tensions between employers and employees; or constitute an additional 
management burden on employers; or expose employees to scrutiny and possible 
adverse consequences. Others felt that it could help to change an organisational 
culture without the conflict inherent in reliance upon a legal right to accommodation. 
Some contributors questioned whether such a right to request for religion or belief, 
but not other protected characteristics such as sexual orientation, would be seen as 
giving religion or belief priority over these other characteristics. 
Workshop Four: Edinburgh University, 13 February 2015. 
Participants 
David Bradwell, Catriona Cannon, Professor Peter Cumper, John Deighan, 
Professor Peter Edge, Colin Emerson, Dr Matt Gibson, Irene Henery, Dr Karen 
Jochelson, Dr Gordon MacDonald, Dr Javier Oliva, Dr Dave Perfect, Macca 
Teclehaimanot, Kieran Turner, Professor Lucy Vickers, Professor Paul Weller, Lynn 
Welsh. 
Summary of discussion 
We introduced the Workshop with a brief description of the overall purpose of the 
project. The review of the effectiveness and interpretation of religion or belief law 
formed part of an EHRC programme of work, which also included its call for 
evidence on religion or belief in the workplace and service delivery. This Workshop 
had a particular focus on reasonable accommodation of religion or belief and 
conscientious objection. 
We framed the discussion around two short presentations: a discussion of 
reasonable accommodation of religion or belief drawing on international 
comparisons, particularly with the US and Canada; and a discussion of 
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conscientious objection in the workplace, with an emphasis on UK cases such as 
Ladele. 
There was disagreement between participants as to whether a duty of reasonable 
accommodation would make a significant practical difference from the current law. 
There was a suggestion that the standard of review would be important here, with a 
contrast being drawn between the Canadian and US approaches. Such a duty may 
simplify the process of bringing individual claims in relation to indirect discrimination 
law; or be seen as less confrontational than indirect discrimination claims. The 
broader impact on an employer of losing a reasonable accommodation claim, as 
opposed to an indirect discrimination claim, was also discussed, with the suggestion 
made that a finding that the employer had failed to accommodate religion and belief 
could lead to future indirect discrimination claims, as well as potential claims, for 
public sector employees, of claims under the Public Sector Equality Duty. 
We discussed the idea of a right to request, raised in other Workshops. There was 
some suggestion that it could improve discussions regarding religious 
accommodation between employer and employee, which was important, but it was 
not generally seen as a strong way forward. Most participants recognised the 
difficulty of constructive dialogue within the setting of a legal action, with a number of 
participants seeing mediation as a better way to resolve disputes in this area. 
A recurring theme was the distinctiveness, or otherwise, of religion or belief. Some 
participants queried the creation of a duty of reasonable accommodation for religion 
or belief, and not for other grounds in equality law. This was generally from concern 
that such a distinction would provide too much protection for religion or belief, but it 
was also suggested that the language of accommodation was inherently 
majoritarian: minorities needed to be 'accommodated' by the majority. Others felt that 
looking to the existing reasonable adjustment rules in relation to disability was not a 
productive way to develop new law in relation to religion or belief. 
The variety of religious beliefs was also discussed. It was suggested that even within 
a religious community, individuals would vary as to what they could and could not 
accept: some individuals would be identified by co-religionists as having a 
particularly tender conscience, and this could change over time within a single 
individual. It was also suggested that flexibility by a religious community might lead 
to less protection by the law, as it indicated that a particular individual could 
accommodate generally applicable legal duties more easily. One participant 
suggested that as religious communities became more flexible by being more 
accommodating in their approach, they became less secure in protecting their 
religious rights. 
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We also discussed the basis for restricting, or failing to accommodate, religious 
interests, including requests to be exempt from work tasks that might be framed as 
conscientious objection. It was suggested that there was a broad consensus that 
religious practice should be permitted unless there was a good reason not to do so, 
but that there was considerable difference of opinion as to what constituted a good 
reason. There was a clear distinction between those who saw the integrity of state 
non-discrimination laws (and other state values) as in itself a good reason, and those 
who did not; and those who gave considerable weight to dignitary harm and those 
who gave less weight. A distinction would be drawn by some between requests for 
conscientious objection that give rise to dignitary harm to others due to the impact on 
other protected groups, and those requests that do not have such results. In 
assessing requests for conscientious objection or other forms of accommodation, 
contributors differed as to how much weight they would give to a range of factors: an 
employer being a small one; or in the public sector; or in a sector in which their 
religious community was underrepresented; or in which the employer has a religious 
ethos; or is run by individuals with a particular religious commitment. Contributors 
also differed as to how much weight they would give to the impact of a failure to 
accommodate on the individual, with some participants seeing this as a very serious 
individual cost. Within this, some suggested that the specificity of a career path, and 
the age of the employee who would be affected by a failure to accommodate, should 
both be considered.  
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